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INTRODUCTION
everal aspects of the trade policies of African countries
currently suffer from neglect in the legal literature. This
article intends to add to the existing stream of research and fill
the gap by tackling trade measures geared toward sustainable
development and environmental protection in Africa, with a
S
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particular focus on the growing body of legislation to restrict
the use of plastic bags. The integration of developing countries
into the global economy in general, and in the world trading
system in particular, continues to resonate strongly in different
constituencies. Nowhere in the world is that need to integrate
as acute as it is in sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries
continue to rely on development assistance.
1
The launch of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha (“Development”)
Round, with developing countries’ needs and interests at the
center of the work program, was an important testament to
that concern.
2
While the negotiations are still expected to de-
liver on their promises to the WTO’s underdeveloped members,
trade expansion has been met by enormous challenges, espe-
cially environmental degradation.
3
Conscious of this threat for present and future generations,
as well as the need to preserve the environment from man-
induced degradation, many African countries have undertaken
to ban plastic bags within their respective territories. For in-
stance, in August 2017, Kenya enforced what has come to be
known as the world’s toughest plastic bag legislation.
4
This
move followed that of Rwanda, which had been enforcing a
1. See generally Joseph Fosu, Sub-Saharan Africa: The Challenge of Inte-
gration into the Global Trading System, 10 PERSPECTIVES ON GLOB. DEV. &
TECH. 115 (2011). The aftermath of the Uruguay Round signaled developing
countries’ concerns about the results of trade liberalization, especially those
of net food importer countries, as it was already anticipated that the generat-
ed gains would not be evenly shared. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMICS
PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPINGCOUNTRIES 30²40 (1995).
2. The Doha Round launched in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar, with the
aim of not only achieving major reform of the international trading system
through the introduction of lower trade barriers and revised trade rules, but
also to improve the trading prospects of developing countries. See World
Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001, WTO
Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Ministerial
Declaration].
3. In fact, the conclusion of the Uruguay Round not only opened doors to
implementation challenges, but also put the world trading system in front of
the new realities of regionalism and the interaction between trade and the
environment. SeeWORLDBANK, supra note 1, at 40.
4. The severity of the penalty associated with the prohibition has spurred
extensive media coverage. See Kenya brings in world’s toughest plastic bag
ban: four years jail or $40,000 fine, GUARDIAN (Aug. 28, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/aug/28/kenya-brings-in-
worlds-toughest-plastic-bag-ban-four-years-jail-or-40000-
fine?CMP=share_btn_link.
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plastic bag prohibition for more than a decade. Since then,
South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and
a dozen other African countries have all joined the fight against
plastic as an environmental hazard.
While the global move to regulate plastic bags is somewhat
wavering,
5
African countries have embraced the universal con-
cern over environmental protection in line with the objectives
of the 1994 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.
6
These states have implemented measures to ban, restrict, or
tax the manufacture, importation, and trade of plastic bags.
While some countries, like Rwanda, have banned plastic bags
entirely, others, like South Africa, have instead chosen to com-
bine the ban of thinner plastic bags with a tax on the sale and
use of thicker ones.
7
Despite the disparity among African coun-
tries in the adoption and application of these measures, like
anywhere else in the world,
8
the rationale for this revolution
stems from the fact that plastic bags are used for food packag-
ing, and therefore may pose serious human health concerns
5. See Jennifer Clapp & Linda Swanston, Doing Away with Plastic Shop-
ping Bags: International Patterns of Norm Emergence and Policy Implemen-
tation, 18 ENVTL. POL. 315 (2009). The authors also find this from-South-to-
North pattern of norm adoption to be the “opposite of the patterns typically
seen with international norms.” Id. at 318.
6. One of the objectives of the WTO is to allow its members to conduct
relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour “with a view to raising
standards of living . . . and expanding the production of and trade in goods
and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development.” See Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, recital 1 of pmbl.,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (emphasis added) [hereinafter WTO Agree-
ment]. On the fact that this preambular aspiration, which “explicitly
acknowledges ¶the objective of sustainable development,’” informs “not only
the GATT 1994, but also the other [WTO] covered agreements,” see Appellate
Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (US – Shrimp), ¶ 129, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R, (adopted
Nov. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp].
7. See, e.g., Johane Dikgang, Anthony Leiman & Martine Visser, Analysis
of the Plastic-Bag Levy in South Africa, 66 RES., CONSERVATION & RECYCLING
59 (2012).
8. See Clapp & Swanston, supra note 5, at 316 (arguing that the anti-
plastic bags norm somehow originated from the global South on an ad hoc
basis in several jurisdictions simultaneously, and were translated differently
by implementing communities).
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due to the residue of chemicals used in their manufacture.
9
Moreover, plastic bags are capable of threatening the environ-
ment, as well as animal and plant life.
10
Hence, safeguarding a
clean and safe environment, a precondition for sustainable de-
velopment, is a shared rationale across the countries con-
cerned.
Although WTO agreements are often criticized for restraining
members’ policy autonomy,
11
countries frequently take actions
to protect their environment. This paper focuses on trade
measures or policies geared toward sustainable development
and environmental protection in Africa. It concentrates specifi-
cally on the plastic bag laws enacted by a number of African
countries to safeguard the environment and public health. As
WTO members, these African countries’ respective measures
are capable of restricting trade and are potentially subject to
challenges if not applied in a WTO-compliant manner.
This article responds to the debate on regulatory autonomy
and international regulatory cooperation concerning environ-
mental protection in Africa. It analyzes the contribution of Af-
rican countries to non-trade concerns, notably the sustainable
development goals of international trade law. While the focus is
on Africa, the international trade implications of these
measures are relevant for current or future plastic measures
taken by other WTO members, whether developed or develop-
ing country-members. The imposition of such measures would
be susceptible to trigger disputes, especially in the context of a
9. See generally M. Whitt et al., Survey of Heavy Metal Contamination in
Recycled Polyethylene Terephthalate Used for Food Packaging, 29 J. OF
PLASTIC FILM&SHEETING 163 (2012).
10. U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), Selection, Design and Imple-
mentation of Economic Instruments in the Solid Waste Management Sector in
Kenya, at 23²24, (2005),
https://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/8655/Selection-
Design-Implementation-of-Economic- Instruments-Solid-Waste-Management-
Kenya.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y.
11. Reduced or limited policy space is very often voiced by WTO develop-
ing-country members who generally claim that by undertaking multilateral
commitments, little room is left for the pursuit of policies in the national in-
terest. See generally Jörg Mayer, Policy Space: What, For What, and Where?,
27 DEV. POL’Y REV. 373 (2009). See also Sheila Page, Policy Space: Are WTO
Rules Preventing Development?, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 14
(Jan. 2007).
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resurgent use of environmental measures to advance industrial
policies.
12
It is true that African countries, which represent about one-
quarter of overall WTO membership, generally have not partic-
ipated in shaping the WTO dispute settlement system. Empiri-
cal studies find that developing countries’ low level of exports
also translates into fewer opportunities to face import trade
barriers in destination countries, which could give them an op-
portunity to bring a complaint.
13
In a similar vein, this sug-
gests that developing countries generally would not be prone to
erect domestic trade barriers to protect local producers if they
depend on imports to satisfy their national market. Thus, on
the complainant side, a number of reasons have been cited as
preventing developing countries’ participation in WTO litiga-
tion. These constraints, according to Gregory Shaffer, are of
three main orders: (1) lack of legal expertise in WTO law, (2)
financial constraints to meet the costs associated with litiga-
tion, and (3) political economy challenges (associated with pow-
er imbalance between sometimes aid-receiving countries or
12. See e.g. Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and
Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L.
REV. 401 (2014). Plastic bag regulations are susceptible to challenges because,
while they may be imposed to pursue legitimate domestic environmental poli-
cies, they also restrict trade.
13. See generally Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis, & Hakan Nordstrom,
Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?, CTR. FOR ECON.
POL’Y RES. DISCUSSIONS PAPER 2340 (1999); see also Joseph Francois, Henrik
Horn, & Niklas Kaunitz, Trading Profiles and Developing Country Participa-
tion in the WTO Dispute Settlement System, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEV. ISSUE PAPER NO. 6 (2008). This conclusion, however, de-
serves to be nuanced. Weaker countries, by virtue of their status, also stand
to face illegalities more frequently than (economically and legally) powerful
countries since they (are known to) lack the capacity to retaliate. On this
score, see Chad P. Bown, Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Com-
plainants, Interested Parties, and Free Riders, 19 WORLD BANK ECON. REV.
287 (2005). This was corroborated by the communication of the WTO African
Group in 2002 during the negotiations of the Dispute Settlement Under-
standing. On that occasion, the Group alleged clearly that the diminutive
participation of African Members, many of which are classified as Least-
Developed Countries (LDCs), “is not because they have never had occasion to
want to enforce their rights, or the obligations of other Members, but due to
structural difficulties of the [Dispute Settlement System].” See Dispute Set-
tlement Body, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, WTO
DOC TN/DS/W/15 (Sept. 25, 2002).
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beneficiaries of special and differential treatment).
14
These rea-
sons notwithstanding, legal capacity seems to be the most
plausible one.
15
On the respondent side, except for Egypt and
South Africa, which have appeared as respondents in a number
of limited cases,
16
practice shows that economic size and stakes
14. See generally Gregory G. Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strate-
gies for Developing Country Adaptation, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 177 (2006).
Taking the example of WTO developed-country members, such as the United
States and the European Community³which, despite their armies of well-
trained government lawyers, still resort to the services of private law firms,
companies and trade associations³the author argues essentially that devel-
oping countries, if left on their own, cannot cope with these challenges. Id. at
177. The author then explores various strategies to address these challenges,
including, but not limited to, institutional capacity building initiatives that
also include the private sector and civil society representatives. Id. at 197.
15. See generally Marc L. Busch, Eric Reinhardt & Gregory Shaffer, Does
Legal Capacity Matter? A Survey of WTO Members, 8 WORLD TRADE REV. 559
(2009). Yet, the Advisory Center on WTO Law, as an international legal aid
structure, was actually set up to deal with some of these legal challenges,
especially expertise and the costs associated thereto. It seems to have been of
great support in that sense, even though (discounted rate) access is still cited
by some developing countries as a barrier. See Jan Bohanes & Fernanda Gar-
za, Going beyond Stereotypes: Participation of Developing Countries in WTO
Dispute Settlement, 4 TRADE, L. & DEV. 45, 70²75 (2012).
16. See, e.g., Request for Consultations by Thailand, Egypt – Import Prohi-
bition on Canned Tuna with Soybean Oil, WTO Doc WT/DS205/1 (Sept. 27,
2000) (abandoned prior to panel’s stage); Panel Report, Egypt – Definitive
Anti-Dumping Measures on Steel Rebar from Turkey, WTO Doc. WT/DS211/R
(adopted Oct. 1, 2002) (where Egypt’s definitive anti-dumping measures were
found inconsistent with the Antidumping Agreement, and it had to imple-
ment the panel’s findings to bring its measure into conformity with its obliga-
tions); Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Egypt – Measures Affecting
Imports Textile and Apparel Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS305/4 (May 25, 2005)
(settled by mutually agreed solution between Egypt and the United States);
Request for the Establishment of a Panel by Pakistan, Egypt – Anti-Dumping
Duties on Matches from Pakistan, WTO Doc. WT/DS327/2 (June 10, 2005)
(settled by mutually agreed solution between Pakistan and Egypt); Request
for Consultations by India, South Africa – Anti-Dumping Duties on Certain
Pharmaceutical Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS168/1 (Apr. 13, 1999) (resolved at
the Consultation phase); Request for Consultations by Turkey, South Africa –
Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Blanketing, WTO Doc. WT/DS288/1
(Apr. 15, 2003); Request for Consultations by Indonesia, South Africa – Anti-
Dumping Measures on Uncoated Woodfree Paper, WTO Doc. WT/DS374/1
(May 16, 2008) (terminated after a mutually agreed solution); Request for
Consultations by Brazil, South Africa – Anti-Dumping Duties on Frozen Meat
of Fowls from Brazil,WTO Doc. WT/DS439/1 (June 25, 2012).
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in global trade shield WTO African-country members from le-
gal battles.
Consequently, it is likely that African countries’ plastic
measures, whether notified or applied in compliance with mul-
tilateral trade rules, would go unchallenged, although they can
potentially be the object of disputes. Even if African countries’
plastic regulations were to fare undisputed, this article’s analy-
sis informs other, more “powerful” countries (from the WTO
standpoint) with similar measures that stand to be scrutinized
against their commitments under WTO-covered agreements.
With the foregoing in mind, Part I of this article sets the scene
for WTO African-country members’ plastic regulations in the
framework of the apparent conflict between trade liberalization
and environmental protection. Parts II through V address
these measures in light of their compatibility with multilateral
trade rules. Part VI concludes the review, suggesting, among
others, that these measures may fare unchallenged due to the
evenhandedness in their application and the developing coun-
try status of these states, even though they sometimes fail to
comply with the transparency requirement of WTO-covered
agreements.
I. THE BAN OF PLASTIC BAGS IN AFRICA IN THE TRADE AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT
The implementation of African countries’ plastic bag regula-
tions as environmental policies are also measures capable of
restricting international trade. This is reminiscent of the trade
and environment debate that surfaced in the 1990s, with a pal-
pable tension between the competing objectives of trade liberal-
ization and environmental protection.
17
This section sets the
17. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Excep-
tions in GATT Article XX, 25 J. OF WORLD TRADE 37 (1991) (examining what
he sees as a “new attitude” about the GATT in the context of the 1992 Rio de
Janeiro UN Conference on Environment and Development and the emer-
gence of the long-dormant “trade and the environment” topic); David Pal-
meter, Environment and Trade: Much Ado About Little?, 27 J. OF WORLD
TRADE 55 (1993) (arguing that the apparent conflict between the goals of a
cleaner environment and freer trade falls “somewhere between the non-
existent and the minimal”); Matthew H. Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U. S. Law
and the Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tu-
na/Dolphin Decision, 92 COLUM. L. REV 2098 (1992) (expressing the United
States’ “growing impatience” with the multilateral approach to environmen-
tal protection in a context of what he sees as a lack of provisions allowing
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scene for these plastic bag regulations in light of that apparent
conflict.
A. International Trade and Environmental Protection in Africa
Economists consider that the liberalization of trade has a
positive impact on the economy. As a major contributor to eco-
nomic growth, trade also contributes its share to poverty reduc-
tion.
18
Yet, the benefit of growth does not come without a cost
on environmental and social resources. In that context, gov-
ernments engaged in sustainable development initiatives are
confronted with the issue of how best to balance the challenges
and opportunities of growth with the imperative of environ-
mental protection.
While environmental issues have somehow come into the
limelight of debates at the global scale, the effects of economic
integration on the environment were a principal concern when
the multilateral trading system was rebuilt after the Second
World War.
19
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) 1947 exception clause, notably Article XX, only in-
cludes indirect references to these effects.
20
In the early 1990s, the environmentalist community feared
that there could be a conflict between trade liberalization and
enhanced environmental protection, especially against the
backdrop of the Rio Earth Summit of 1992.
21
In particular,
trade restrictions as a means of enforcing a country’s environmental stand-
ards extraterritorially); Robert Howse, The Turtles Panel – Another Environ-
mental Disaster in Geneva, 32 J. OFWORLD TRADE 73 (1998).
18. It is also argued that trade liberalization can directly enhance envi-
ronmental protection and be a good policy tool to promote sustainable devel-
opment. On this score, see Gregory Shaffer, WTO Blue-Green Blues: The Im-
pact of U.S. Domestic Politics on Trade-Labor, Trade-Environment Linkages
for the WTO’s Future, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 608, 634²36 (2000).
19. DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT: TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
FUTURE 9 (1994).
20. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. It should, however, be men-
tioned that states’ familiarity with and use of trade measures to restrict trade
is anterior to the GATT. See generally Charnovitz, supra note 17. In fact, a
convention to preserve (colonial) African wildlife already recognized the need
for export restriction as early as 1890. See Daniel Bodansky & Jessica C.
Lawrence, Trade and Environment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L
TRADE L. 505, 513 (Daniel Bethlehem et al. eds., 2009).
21. One “triggering event” was the announcement made by the United
States to start negotiations for a trade agreement with Mexico. See ESTY,
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some considered the ruling in US – Tuna I
22
to be an indication
that GATT rules were not sufficiently responsive to environ-
mental concerns.
23
On the other side of the debate, the trade
community suspected that environmental matters could be
used for protectionist purposes, or that environmental stand-
ards could have the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to
trade.
24
By the time the WTO was created in 1995, environ-
mental issues had gained worldwide attention. This led to their
inclusion in several agreements.
Indeed, besides Article XX of the GATT, which allows gov-
ernments to justify measures otherwise inconsistent with the
principles of GATT in order to protect human, animal, or plant
life or health, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade
(TBT Agreement) recognizes countries’ rights to adopt the
products’ standards that they consider appropriate for the
same reasons.
25
Nationally pursued environmental policies fall
within the scope of the TBT Agreement. Taking active steps to
protect the environment, however, is beyond the WTO mandate
under international law. The WTO is not, and does not aspire
to become, an environmental protection organization. Its role in
the “trade and environment” galaxy is strictly limited to trade
policies and the aspects of environmental policies that have a
significant effect on trade.
26
There is, however, equally nothing
in the WTO Agreements requiring free trade to be accorded
supra note 19, at 27²29.American environmentalists became wary about
trade expansion with a developing country that may lack a certain degree of
environmental awareness. Id. This resulted in the inclusion of environmental
provisions in the trade deal that carried over to the GATT, which coinci-
dentally was grappling with a high-profile dispute over a tuna import ban. Id.
22. See generally Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on Im-
ports of Tuna (US – Tuna I), DS21/R (Sept. 3, 1991), GATT BISD (39
th
Supp.)
(1993) [hereinafter Report of the Panel, US – Tuna I].
23. See Robert Howse, The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle
Case: A New Legal Baseline for the Trade and Environment Debate, 27
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 489, 490 (2002).
24. Id. at 491.
25. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 1868
U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT Agreement].
26. See Trade Negotiations Committee, Ministerial Declaration on Trade
and Environment of Apr. 14, 1994, recital 5, GATT Doc.
MNT.TNC/MIN(94)/1/Rev.1, 33 I.L.M 1267 (1994). See also Doha Ministerial
Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 6 (reaffirming the WTO Members’ commitments
to the “protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable devel-
opment”).
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priority over other societal values and interests that conflict or
compete with free trade. In effect, the objective of sustainable
development is emphasized in the WTO’s founding charter, the
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.
27
Additionally,
WTO members have entrusted the Committee on Trade and
Development and the Committee on Trade and Environment to
each act “as a forum to identify and debate developmental and
environmental aspects of the negotiations in order to further
the objective of having sustainable development appropriately
reflected.”
28
Nevertheless, the relationship between trade liberalization
and environmental protection has evolved in a conflicting and
controversial manner.
29
The much-criticized GATT panel deci-
sion in US – Tuna I,
30
the ruling of which resulted in an outcry
from environmentalists, became emblematic in the trade ver-
sus environment debate.
31
In that case, Mexico challenged the
United States Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) of
1972, as revised,
32
which required a general prohibition on the
“taking” (harassment, hunting, capture, killing, or attempt
thereof) and importation of marine mammals into the United
States (US), except where an exception was explicitly author-
ized.
33
The goal of the MMPA was to reduce the “incidental kill
or serious injury of marine mammals in the course of commer-
cial fishing” to “insignificant levels approaching zero.”
34
The US
fishermen were required to use certain fishing techniques to
reduce the taking of dolphins incidental to the harvesting of
fish.
27. See WTO Agreement, supra note 6, recital 1 of pmbl. See also GATT,
supra note 20, arts. XX(b) & XX(g).
28. Doha Ministerial Declaration, supra note 2, ¶ 51.
29. Professor Jackson explains why pursuing these two goals has led to a
“policy discord.” See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental
Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1227, 1227²28
(1992).
30. See Report of the Panel, US – Tuna I, supra note 22.
31. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Environment and Trade Measures after the Tu-
na/Dolphin Decision, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1221, 1221 (1992).
32. See Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92²522, 86
Stat. 1027 (1972), amended by Pub. L. No. 100²711, 102 Stat. 4755 (1988)
and Pub. L. No. 101²627, § 901, 104 Stat. 4436, 4467 (1990).
33. Report of the Panel, US – Tuna I, supra note 22, ¶ 2.3.
34. Id.
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Consequently, fish caught with commercial fishing technolo-
gy resulting in the incidental killing or serious injury of ocean
mammals were not allowed in the US customs territory. This
ban affected Mexican yellowfin tuna and yellowfin tuna prod-
ucts that were caught with purse-seine nets. Mexico contended
that these measures were inconsistent with the GATT, espe-
cially the prohibition of quantitative restrictions.
35
The US ar-
gued that its embargo was justified under Article XX(b) of the
GATT as a measure necessary to protect the life and health of
dolphins.
36
The US further argued that dolphins were an ex-
haustible natural resource and that the ban was a measure re-
lating to its conservation pursuant to Article XX(g) of the
GATT.
37
The Panel sided with Mexico, reasoning that Article XX(b)
limits the protection of human, animal, or plant life or health
to the jurisdiction of the importing country, and not outside.
38
Even assuming that Article XX(b) permitted extrajurisdictional
application, the Panel decided that the US failed to meet the
requirement of necessity because the US had not, in the Panel’s
view, “exhausted all options reasonably available to it to pur-
sue its dolphin protection objectives.”
39
The US import ban,
therefore, failed to pass the test of Article XX(b).
40
The US em-
bargo equally failed the Article XX(g) test because, not only
was the extrajurisdictional application of conservation policies
not allowed under this provision, but also because Article XX(g)
requires such a measure to be “primarily aimed at” the conser-
vation of exhaustible natural resources.
41
According to the
Panel, the US had “linked the maximum incidental dolphin-
taking rate which Mexico had to meet during a particular peri-
od in order to be able to export tuna to the [US] to the taking
rate actually recorded for [US] fishermen during the same pe-
riod.”
42
As such, Mexico could not possibly know at what point
in time its conservation policies complied with the US conser-
vation standards. For the Panel, therefore, a “limitation on
35. Id. ¶ 3.1.
36. Id. ¶ 3.33.
37. Id. ¶¶ 3.40²3.42.
38. Id. ¶¶ 5.25²5.27.
39. Id. ¶ 5.28.
40. Id. ¶ 5.29.
41. Id. ¶¶ 5.32²5.33.
42. Id. ¶ 5.33.
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trade based on such unpredictable conditions” could not be re-
garded as “being primarily aimed at the conservation of dol-
phins.”
43
The Panel’s ruling in US – Tuna I, finding US measures ille-
gal from a WTO law standpoint, attracted acrimony from envi-
ronmentalists. Some even accused “GATT-zilla,” the trade
monster,
44
of being a disaster for the environment. Later, in US
– Tuna II, the Panel arrived at substantially the same decision
as the US – Tuna I Panel, thus confirming, in the view of envi-
ronmentalists, a bias against environmental protection.
45
These
cases set the scene for many who continue to perceive the rela-
tionship between trade and the environment to be adversarial
in nature. Since then, the WTO has increasingly faced pressure
to reconcile its free trade agenda with mounting requests to
watch over non-trade concerns, such as environmental, labor,
or public health issues.
Still, these critiques are at times exaggerated. In fact, the en-
try into force of the WTO in 1995, and the establishment of its
standing Appellate Body, marked a departure from the hither-
to strict interpretation of non-trade concerns towards a more
constitutional and balanced reading of WTO agreements.
46
The
landmark case US – Gasoline, in which the Appellate Body
emphasized WTO members’ sovereignty to determine their en-
vironment policies, called the tune in this regard.
47
That deci-
sion, and the Appellate Body’s new approach to the WTO’s sus-
tainable development objectives, are rightly considered by
scholars as “the consecration of WTO [m]embers’ fundamental
right to take measures to protect the environment . . . at a level
43. Id.
44. See Jackson, supra note 29, at 1235 (citing Nancy Dunne, Fears Over
‘GATT-Zilla the Trade Monster,’ FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 1992)).
45. Report of the Panel, United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna
(US – Tuna II), DS29/R (June 16, 1994), unadopted [hereinafter Report of the
Panel, US – Tuna II].
46. See Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization 20 Years On: Global
Governance by Judiciary, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 47²48 (2016). Howse argues
that the deliberate and strict interpretation of GATT was rooted in the “crude
economistic ideology and strong deregulatory orientation” of that time, which
rendered any public policies virtually impossible to justify under the general
exceptions. Id.
47. Appellate Body Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated
and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), 1, 30, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/AB/R,
(adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter Apellate Body Report, US – Gasoline].
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they consider appropriate.”
48
Consequently, when deciding that
the US had not applied its measures in a non-discriminatory
manner, the Appellate Body made the following, sometimes
overlooked, dictum in US – Shrimp:
[In this dispute], [w]e have not decided that the protection
and preservation of the environment is of no significance to
the Members of the WTO. Clearly, it is. And we have not de-
cided that sovereign states should not act together . . . either
within the WTO or in other international fora, to protect en-
dangered species or to otherwise protect the environment.
Clearly, they should and do.
49
The Appellate Body is unambiguously reaffirming countries’
policy spaces to adopt environmental protection measures, so
much so that environmentalists’ grievances against the WTO
do not always seem to be well-founded. However, when con-
fronted with trade-restrictive national regulations, such as
plastic bag regulations, the challenge for the WTO adjudicator
is to strike a delicate balance between the competing impera-
tive of free trade and that country’s regulatory autonomy.
50
African countries have battled for decades not only with se-
vere cyclical economic crises, but also with environmental cri-
ses, some of which emanated from colonial environmental
management policies, or lack thereof.
51
While their environ-
mental laws have for years been rooted in their colonial pasts,
a progressive shift began in the 1970s regarding African coun-
tries’ environmental legislations.
52
Almost all of the African
countries’ constitutions drafted after 1970 contained a refer-
48. Gabrielle Marceau & Julian Wyatt, The WTO’s Efforts to Balance Eco-
nomic Development and Environmental Protection: A Short Review of Appel-
late Body Jurisprudence, 1 LATINAM. J. INT’L TRADE L. 291, 294 (2013).
49. Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, supra note 6, ¶ 185, (emphasis in
original).
50. Emily Lydgate, Sustainable Development in the WTO: From Mutual
Supportiveness to Balancing, 11 WORLD TRADE REV. 621, 632 (2012). See also
Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, supra note 47, at 30 (where the Appel-
late Body cautioned that Members’ autonomy “is circumscribed . . . by the
need to respect the requirements of the [GATT] and the other covered agree-
ments”).
51. See generally Annie P. Kameri-Mbote & Philippe Cullet, Law, Coloni-
alism and Environmental Management in Africa, 6 REV. EUR., COMP. & INT’L
ENVTL. L. 23 (1997).
52. See Bondi D. Ogolla, Environmental Law in Africa: Status and Trends,
23 INT’LBUS. L. 412, 412²13 (1995).
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ence to a certain “right” to a clean or healthy environment.
53
This trend continued through the 1990s and the 2000s, when
environmental challenges linked to economic development
gained prominence. Even when a constitution was silent re-
garding the environment, courts would actively champion sus-
tainable development by interpreting the constitutional right to
life as including the right to a healthy environment.
54
Another feature of the environmental policies designed in
post-colonial Africa has been the combination of command and
control regulations, like outright prohibition, with economic
instruments, like levies.
55
This holds true for modern plastic
bag legislation, where certain African countries impose crimi-
nal sanctions on defaulters in a bid to induce compliance, while
others prefer to tax producers, retailers, and eventually con-
sumers for the use.
B. Plastic Bag Ban in Furtherance of Sustainable Development:
East Africa Calls the Tune
While almost all African regions have instituted plastic bag
measures with the same objective to contribute to sustainable
development, the strictest regulations so far have come from
East Africa, particularly Kenya and Rwanda. The penalties en-
forced against defaulters of these laws are a testament to the
environmental awareness of the imposing countries.
1. Rwanda
In a session on July 2, 2008, the parliament of Rwanda
adopted a law prohibiting the manufacture, importation, use,
53. Id. at 414²15. Some of these constitutional principles are simple mim-
ics of European and other developed countries’ environmentalists’ postures,
and stranger to local peoples’ concerns at that particular time in history. See
Kameri-Mbote & Cullet, supra note 51, at 24. This does not necessarily mean
that pre-colonial Africa lacked environmental preservation strategies. See
generally Paul Richards, Community Environmental Knowledge in African
Rural Development, 10 INST. OFDEV. STUD. BULL. 28 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Joseph D. Kessy and Others v. City Council of Dar es Salaam,
4 I.E.L.R. 445 (1991) (High Court of Tanz.); Waweru v. Republic (2006) 1
K.L.R. 677, 677, 683 (Kenya).
55. See UNEP, supra note 10, at 10. See also Reviva Hasson, Anthony
Leiman & Martine Visser, The Economics of Plastic Bag Legislation in South
Africa, 75 S. AFR. J. ECON. 66 (2007).
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and sale of polythene bags in Rwanda.
56
With the enactment of
this legislation, Rwanda became one of the first countries in
the world, let alone in Africa, to actually enforce a ban on the
use of non-biodegradable plastic bags in its territory. The plas-
tic bag regulation draws its source from the Organic Law of
2005 that determined the modalities of protecting, conserving,
and promoting the environment in Rwanda.
57
The Organic
Law, which is mainly aimed at “conserving the environment,
people and their habitats”
58
and guarantees all citizens of the
country a “sustainable development which does not harm the
environment and the social welfare of the population,”
59
was
based on a number of well-known environmental law princi-
ples.
60
With regard to the protection of biodiversity, and in a bid to
regulate human activities in this sense, Article 26 of the Or-
ganic Law provides, “[a]ny activities that may pollute the at-
mospheric pressure are governed by an order of the Minister
having environment in his or her attributions. Burning of gar-
bage, waste or any other object (tires, plastics, polythene bags
and others) shall respect regulation of competent authorities.”
61
In addition, the law controls the manner in which waste has to
be managed and disposed of, including plastics.
62
To guarantee
the implementation of the government’s environmental policy,
in particular the Organic Law, the Rwanda Environment Man-
agement Authority (REMA) was created.
63
56. Law No. 57/2008 of September 10, 2008 Relating to the Prohibition of
Manufacturing, Importation, Use and Sale of Polythene Bags in Rwanda,
Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda (O.G), Mar. 23, 2009, p. 78 [here-
inafter Rwanda, Plastic Bag Law].
57. See generally Organic Law No. 04/2005 of April 8, 2005 Determining
the Modalities for Protection Conservation and Promotion of the Environ-
ment in Rwanda, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda (O.G)., May 1,
2005 [hereinafter Rwanda, Organic Law].
58. Id. art. 1(1).
59. Id. art. 1(5).
60. Id. art. 7 (speaking of (i) the precaution and protection principles; (ii)
the principle of sustainability and equal opportunities among generations;
(iii) the polluter pays principle; (iv) the principle of information dissemination
and Community sensitization in conservation and protection of the environ-
ment; and (v) the principle of information).
61. Id. art. 26.
62. Id, arts. 32²35, 109(1).
63. Id. art. 65(1). On the mandates, roles, and functions of REMA, see Law
No. 16/2006 of April 3, 2006 Determining the Organisation, Functioning and
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The protection of environmental and sustainable natural re-
source management is a central pillar of Rwanda’s Vision 2020,
in which the country seeks to diminish pressure on natural re-
sources and reverse environmental degradation.
64
It is there-
fore not surprising that Rwanda will proceed to regulate the
use of plastic bags, the disposal of which was identified as a
problem for the protection of the environment by the Organic
Law. As its name indicates, the purpose of the Plastic Bag Law
is to prohibit “the manufacturing, usage, importation and sale
of polythene bags in Rwanda.”
65
The measure here, therefore, is
the “prohibition” of the polythene bag, which is defined under
Article 2 of the law as “a synthetic industrial product with a
low density composed of numerous chemical molecules ethene
[which in] most cases . . . is used in packaging of various prod-
ucts.”
66
The measure imposes a rather heavy penalty for defaulters.
Those in violation face between six months to twelve months
imprisonment and a fine for both manufacturing companies
and individuals found to be selling or using polythene bags.
67
Nonetheless, the law balances rigidity and the imperative to
fight against environmental degradation with instances of ne-
cessity. In effect, the law can be derogated from following an
express authorization by the REMA.
68
Derogation, however, is
not tantamount to granting a carte blanche to manufacturers
or eventual importers. Authorization can only be sought and
granted for a bag specifically included on an exemption list of
plastic bags “necessary to be used in exceptional cases” in
Rwanda.
69
The Prime Minister has not yet publicly announced
such an exception list, which will be periodically updated as
provided for by the law,
70
nor has he clarified what constitutes
“exceptional cases.” A study conducted in the field, however,
revealed that the first beneficiaries of the exemption were the
Responsibilities of Rwanda Environment Management Authority, Official
Gazaette of the Republic of Rwanda (O.G.), (June 1, 2006), p.10.
64. See Republic of Rwanda, Rwanda Vision 2020 (rev’d, 2012),
http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/fileadmin/templates/documents/NDPR/Vision_2
020_.pdf.
65. Rwanda, Plastic Bag Law, art. 1.
66. Id. art. 2.
67. Id. art. 7.
68. Id. art. 5.
69. Id. art. 4.
70. Id.
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military, hospitality, medical, and agricultural sectors.
71
The
official publication of an exemption list is essential to satisfy
the WTO transparency requirement and guarantee predictabil-
ity. This opacity at the domestic level is coherent with the
country’s practice regarding its multilateral trade obligations.
Rwanda is one of the countries that is yet to notify the WTO
organs of its plastic bag ban.
As a Member of the East African Community (EAC), it was
unsurprising that the representative of Rwanda sponsored the
2011 EAC Bill that was tabled before the East African Legisla-
tive Assembly in Kampala, Uganda, on February 3, 2012.
72
Rwanda is understandably interested in seeing other EAC
members adopt a similar, if not the same, level of plastic bag
restriction because the EAC is a common market with goods
moving freely within the region. This implies a risk of smug-
gling plastic bags from countries with no ban into Rwanda, es-
pecially in border cities. Rwanda only joined the EAC in 2007,
alongside Burundi, adding to the founding members of Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda.
73
South Sudan became part of the EAC
in 2016.
74
One objective of the EAC is to promote a sustainable
utilization of the natural resources of the parties and to take
measures to effectively protect the environment.
75
In this vein,
the EAC parties are enjoined to cooperate in all issues of envi-
ronmental and natural resource management, particularly by
adopting common environmental control regulations and
standards, as well as by encouraging the manufacture and use
of bio-degradable packaging materials.
76
By virtue of Article
112(2)(h) of the EAC Treaty, EAC countries are further re-
71. See Audrey Froidbise, Behind the Scenes of the Plastic Bag Ban in
Rwanda: Connections to Culture, Power and Sustainability, at 2 (2015) (un-
published Master’s Thesis, Lund University).
72. East African Community Polythene Materials Control Bill of 2011,
East African Community Gazette No. 11, Aug. 12, 2011 [hereinafter 2011
EAC Bill].
73. See Rwanda, East African Community, https://www.eac.int/eac-
partner-states/rwanda (last visited Nov. 6, 2019).
74. See Republic of South Sudan, East African Community,
https://www.eac.int/eac-partner-states/south-sudan (last visited Nov. 6,
2019).
75. Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community art.
5(3)(c), Nov. 30, 1999, 2144 U.N.T.S 255 (as amended on Dec. 14, 2006 and
Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter EAC Treaty].
76. Id. art. 112.
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quested to “adopt common environment standards for the con-
trol of atmospheric, terrestrial and water pollution arising from
urban and industrial development activities.”
77
Mindful of this environmental cooperation stipulation, the
mover of the 2011 EAC Bill also emphasized in her memoran-
dum that all EAC countries are parties to a number of interna-
tional environmental treaties.
78
The use of polythene materials
needs to be controlled because these materials destroy the en-
vironment and wildlife habitats. The object of the 2011 EAC
Bill, which essentially reproduced the content of the Rwandan
Plastic Bag Law and applied it to all polythene materials, was
“to provide a legal framework for the preservation of a clean
and healthy environment through the prohibition of manufac-
turing, sale, importation and use of polythene materials” in the
EAC.
79
For more than five years, the 2011 EAC Bill was not adopted
by the EAC parliament because of disagreements among the
members echoing worries within their business communities.
80
Stakeholders also raised several concerns, such as waste man-
agement. Consequently, the Rwandan parliamentarian rein-
troduced a similar project with the same objective in 2016, but
with some, albeit minor, modifications.
81
For instance, the 2016
77. Id. art. 112(2)(h).
78. See 2011 EAC Bill, ¶ 1 of the Memorandum of Hon. Patricia M. Hajab-
akiga.
79. Id. ¶ 3.
Paragraph 3 of the 2011 EAC Bill states the following objectives of the Bill:
(a) establish a legal framework for the control of the use of
polythene;
(b) promote the use of environmental friendly package ma-
terials;
(c) preserve and promote a clean and healthy environment
and land use management for sustainable development;
(d) prevent any type of pollution caused by polythene mate-
rials in lakes, rivers and oceans;
(e) protect infrastructure including drainage systems, biodi-
versity and livestock;
(f) brand the East African Community as green and clean.
80. See Njiraini Muchira, Plastics ban Bill stalls in EALA after opposition
from Kenya, EAST AFRICAN (Nov. 25, 2016),
https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/ea/Kenya-opposition-stall-plastics-
ban-Bill-in-EALA/4552908-3464774-12xx0vmz/index.html.
81. East African Community Polythene Materials Control Bill, 2016, EAC
Gazette No.12, Nov. 18, 2016 [hereinafter 2016 EAC Bill].
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EAC Bill added the promotion of recycling to the list of objec-
tives, recognizing that plastic waste had not received due atten-
tion.
82
The list of exempted products in the 2016 EAC Bill was
also more expansive and now includes eight categories of mate-
rials, compared to the five outlined in the 2011 EAC Bill.
83
Alt-
hough discussions regarding the 2016 EAC Bill are still ongo-
ing, the leadership of Rwanda, and by extension the EAC, au-
gurs a better day for environmental protection in Africa. This is
something that should be emulated in other parts of the conti-
nent.
Rwanda launched the war against plastic bags in 2004,
84
which resulted in the passing of the 2005 Organic Law to give
effect to plastic waste disposal. Consequently, the promulgation
of the 2008 plastic bag ban in Rwanda only came to implement
what had already been in place since 2004. Rwanda’s national
move was immediately followed by other countries in Africa,
particularly in East Africa. This has been the case even though
Rwanda’s leadership on the subject appears to be resisted at
the regional level, where many stakes in the business of plastic
conflict with the ideal of environmental protection.
2. Kenya
Like Rwanda, Kenya began to regulate the use of plastic bags
in the early 2000s. In effect, aware that the “environment con-
stitutes the foundation of national economic, social, cultural
and spiritual advancement,” Kenya’s Parliament enacted the
Environmental Management and Coordination Act (EMCA) in
1999.
85
The EMCA acknowledged the country’s constitutional
82. See id. art. 3(f).
83. The list of exemptions comprise of the following: Materials used in (1)
medical services; (2) industrial packaging; (3) the construction industry, in-
cluding water pipes; (4) the manufacture of tents; (5) plumbing, including
water pipes; (6) the agricultural industry; (7) mechanical and machine parts;
and (8) the production of household wares and furniture. 2016 EAC Bill,
sched. Only the first four were broadly covered in the 2011 EAC Bill, sched.
The fact that Rwanda is the sponsor of this bill may give an indication of
what might appear in its own domestic plastic bag law exemption list, which
up to this date has not been adopted or publicized.
84. See Rwanda’s war on plastic bags, BBC NEWS (Oct. 4, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3714126.stm.
85. See generally The Environmental Management and Co-Ordination Act,
No. 8 (1999), Cap. 387 [hereinafter EMCA].
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entitlement to a clean and healthy environment.
86
As the subti-
tle of the law indicates, it is an Act “to provide for the estab-
lishment of an appropriate legal and institutional framework
for the management of the environment and for matters con-
nected therewith and incidental thereto,” and in that vein, it
also puts a duty on every person in Kenya to “safeguard and
enhance the environment.”
87
Section 3 of Kenya’s EMCA enu-
merates the sustainable development principles guiding the
legislation, including the “precautionary principle.”
88
The
EMCA also created the National Environment Management
Authority (NEMA), an institution in charge of the general su-
pervision and coordination of environmental matters, as well as
the implementation of governmental policies relating to the en-
vironment.
89
Regarding the issue of plastics, Section 86 clarifies the
standards of waste. It states that the Standards and Enforce-
ment Review Committee (SERC)
90
will not only “identify mate-
rials and processes that are dangerous to human health and
the environment,” but will also “issue guidelines and prescribe
measures” for their management.
91
Moreover, the SERC is
tasked with developing and advising on “standards of disposal
methods and means for such wastes”
92
or, alternatively, devis-
ing regulations for the “handling, storage, transportation, seg-
regation and destruction of any waste.”
93
It is against this backdrop that Kenya enacted its plastic bag
legislation. In a public notice from Kenya’s Official Gazette on
February 28, 2017, the Cabinet Secretary for Environment and
Natural Resources announced that, effective six months from
86. Id. § 3.
87. Id.
88. See id. § 3(5)(f). Section 2(2) interprets the “precautionary principle” as
“the principle that where there are threats of damage to the environment,
whether serious or irreversible, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation.” Id. § 2(2).
89. Id. §§ 7, 9.
90. This function was previously carried out by the Cabinet Secretary. See
The Environmental Management and Co-Ordination (Amendment) Act
(2015) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT NO. 74 § 55 [hereinafter EMCAA], which
reassigns the tasks to the SERC.
91. EMCA, § 86.
92. Id. § 86(3).
93. Id. § 86(4).
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the date of the notice, a ban on “the use, manufacture and im-
portation of all plastic bags used for commercial and household
packaging.”
94
The measure applies to two categories of bags, to
wit: (a) carrier bags, defined as a “bag constructed with han-
dles, and with or without gussets”; and (b) flat bags, a “bag
constructed without handles, and with or without gussets.”
95
Notified to the TBT Committee under Article 2.10 of the TBT
Agreement, the rationale and the “urgent” problems that the
measure seeks to address are human health or safety and envi-
ronment protection.
96
Unlike Rwanda, Kenya’s ban comes with few exemptions. In
a press release on June 2, 2017, the Director General of NEMA
stated that the ban does not apply to “flat bags used in indus-
trial packaging as long as they are used for industrial primary
packaging at the source of the product and are not available on
sale at the counter or given freely outside the industrial set-
ting.”
97
In other words, only industries that use plastic for the
packaging of their goods at source are exempted. These indus-
tries can equally be domestic manufacturers or importers. To
fully comply with this exemption, the bags “must be labelled
clearly,” such as bearing the logo or other distinctive signs of
the industry concerned,
98
so as to prevent fraud. The exemption
applies mainly to flat bags, not carrier bags.
99
94. See The Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act, No. 2334,
(2017), KENYA GAZETTE [REPUBLIC OF KENYA] NO. 31 [hereinafter Kenya Ga-
zette Notice No. 2334]. In another version of the same issue of the Kenya Ga-
zette, the notice appears as Notice No. 2356, with Notice No. 2334 this time
being reserved to one of the Universities Acts. The reason for this mismatch
is unknown to the present author. However, Notice No. 2334 was preferred
because it is the document that was notified to the WTO TBT Committee. See
Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of Kenya, WTO Doc.
G/TBT/N/KEN/593 (Aug. 30, 2017).
95. Kenya Gazette Notice No. 2334, supra note 94.
96. Notification of Kenya, supra note 94.
97. Geoffrey Wahungu, National Environment Management Authority,
Immediate Press Release ² Ban on Plastic Bags,
http://www.nema.go.ke/images/featured/Ban_on_plastic_bags.pdf (last visited
Nov. 3, 2019).
98. Id.
99. See National Environment Management Authority, Ban on plastic car-
rier bags, NEMA,
https://www.nema.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=10
2&Itemid=120 (last visited Oct. 12, 2019). Since the passing and the entry
into force of the law, about ten statements were issued seeking to clarify the
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Of the measures aimed at reducing the use of plastic bags in
Africa, and in the world generally, Kenya’s efforts appear to be
the most restrictive insofar as Kenya imposes heavy penalties
on contraveners. While the notice does not indicate the appli-
cable sanctions, a look at the underlying legislation reveals the
magnitude of the punishment. Indeed, Section 144 of the
EMCA states:
Any person who contravenes against any provision of this Act
or of regulations made thereunder for which no other penalty
is specifically provided is liable, upon conviction, to impris-
onment for a term of not less than one year but not more than
four years, or to a fine of not less than two million shillings
100
but not more than four million shillings,
101
or to both such fi-
ne and imprisonment.
102
This change, from a penalty of eighteen-month imprisonment
and a fine of about three US Dollars in the principal Act, to the
minimum of about twenty-thousand US Dollars plus a mini-
mum of one-year imprisonment introduced with the plastic bag
law, only goes to demonstrate the seriousness of “environmen-
tal crimes” in Kenya.
Kenya’s severeness toward domestic environment crimes,
particularly with plastic bags, contrasts sharply with its atti-
tude at the regional level. Kenya has been one of the opponents
of the Rwanda-sponsored Bill on the ban of plastics bags before
the EAC Parliament.
103
Environmentalists would definitely
hope that this domestic move signals a policy shift. The same
optimism extends to Uganda, another persistent objector to a
regional plastic bag regulation.
exemptions and to address the disposal of bags that were still in the posses-
sion of citizens. Id. The multiplicity of clarifying notices is a testament to the
difficulty that authorities encounter in implementing the ban.
100. Two million shillings is about 19,650 US Dollars.
101. Four million shillings is equivalent to approximately 39,300 US Dol-
lars.
102. EMCA, § 144, as amended by EMCAA, § 77(b). The original penalty
was of the tune of “not more than eighteen months or to a fine of not more
than three hundred and fifty thousand shillings.” EMCA, § 144.
103. See Njiraini Muchira, Plastics Ban Bill Stalls in EALA after Opposi-
tion from Kenya, EAST AFRICAN (Nov. 25, 2016),
https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news/Kenya-opposition-stall-plastics-ban-
Bill-in-EALA/2558-3464774-6pkgnc/index.html.
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C. Southern Africa Follows Suit
Following their counterparts in East Africa, Southern Africa
countries have also implemented plastic bag measures. These
regulations are addressed here in turn, with a focus on Mauri-
tius, Seychelles, and South Africa.
1. Mauritius
Mauritius is a small island with rather limited resources. As
a tourist destination that is exposed to environmental risks,
the need to manage its environment in a sustainable manner is
really pressing.
104
Mauritius has a tradition of plastic bag regu-
lation dating back to 2003 when it adopted its first Environ-
mental Protection (Plastic Carry Bags) Regulation.
105
The
measure prescribed the standards for the manufacture of a
“vest-type carrier bag made of plastic which is designed for the
general purpose of carrying goods purchased by consumers.”
106
This was not a ban at that point in time, but merely an instruc-
tion relating to the standards of thickness and degradation of
manufactured or imported plastics.
107
Years later, after mounting worldwide concerns regarding the
toxicity of plastics, and after having amended its Environment
Protection Act twice to respond to emerging environmental
challenges,
108
Mauritius promulgated its Environment Protec-
tion (Banning of Plastic Bags) Regulations in August 2015.
109
It
consequently repealed the 2003 Plastic Carry Bags Regula-
tions.
110
To comply with the WTO transparency principle, Mau-
ritius notified the TBT Committee of the regulation in January
2016 under Article 2.10 of the TBT Agreement.
111
The docu-
104. Odile J. Lim Tung, Rethinking the Regulation of Environment Impact
Assessment and Precaution in Mauritius, 61 J. AFR. L. 227, 228 (2017).
105. Environmental Protection (Plastic Carry Bags) Regulations, No. 14
(2004), GOVERNMENTGAZETTE OFMAURITIUS.
106. Id. § 2.
107. See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of Mauri-
tius, WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/MUS/2 (May 3, 2005).
108. See The Environment Protection Act (1991) (Mauritius), as amended in
2002 and 2008.
109. See generally Environment Protection (Banning of Plastic Bags) Regu-
lations, No. 153 (2015), MARUITIUS GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT NO. 81 [hereinafter
Mauritius, Plastic Bag Regulations].
110. Id. § 7.
111. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of Mauritius,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/MUS/5 (Jan. 1, 2016). By notifying under Article 2.10 of
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ment states openly that the purpose of the ban is to protect the
environment, and in case of a dispute, Mauritius would seek
justification under either Article XX(b) or Article XX(g) of the
GATT, or simply under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement.
Under the new regulations, the import, manufacture, sale, or
supply of bags “of any size or type made of plastic, with or
without handles or gussets, designed for carrying” are banned
from the territory except those included in the Schedule of ex-
emption.
112
Such exempted bags include, inter alia, those “de-
signed to be used for the disposal of waste,” bags carried by
passengers disembarking from planes or ships, and bags des-
tined for exports.
113
Interestingly, there is no restriction on the
type of plastic that can be exported. The manufacturing of the
latter category is only subject to registration and the granting
of a permit.
114
By this action, Mauritius did not seek to restrict
investment, both foreign and domestic, in the sector of plastic
bag production. The output must simply be bound for export
and not local consumption.
In addition to the exemption for essential uses, the law pro-
vides that, in case of a disaster, the Minister of Environment
may allow plastic bags in the territory.
115
However, that law
does not define the type of “disaster” necessary to allow the lift-
ing of the ban. Despite this shortcoming, the Mauritius law
contrasts somewhat with other countries, like Rwanda, whose
situation of “emergency” is even more vague.
116
Nevertheless,
the Mauritius measure falls short of specifically stating the
timeframe during which the exceptional measure would oper-
ate in case of disaster. Such a determination certainly rests on
the Minister in charge and would probably be dictated by the
type and nature of the disaster.
the TBT Agreement, like Kenya, Mauritius is also indicating the “urgency” of
the situation that the measure aims to address. Id. For the discussion of the
notification routes, see infra Part VI.D.
112. Mauritius, Plastic Bag Regulations, §§ 2, 4.
113. Id., first sched.
114. Id. § 5.
115. Id. § 4(2).
116. See Mauritius, Plastic Bag Law, art. 4, which essentially states that
the Prime Minister is in charge of establishing a list of polythene bags “nec-
essary to be used in exceptional cases” in the country, without defining what
may constitute as “exceptional cases.” Compared to Rwanda, Mauritius is
slightly more transparent in that its exceptional circumstances are controlled
by the word “disaster.”
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In December 2015, the principal regulations were amended to
include biodegradable plastic bags and compostable plastic
bags on the exemption list.
117
The Environment Protection
(Banning of Plastic Bags) (Amendment) Regulations 2015 spe-
cifically target plastic bags meant to carry goods purchased at a
point of sale, such as a wholesale or retail outlet, a market, a
fair, or a hawker.
118
As mentioned, the amendment stipulates a
number of modifications to the principal regulations. For in-
stance, while it includes a “non-woven polypropylene bag” in
the definition of plastic bags,
119
the ban excludes from its target
biodegradable and compostable plastic bags whose manufac-
ture has to be in conformity with standards prescribed in the
Third Schedule of the Plastic Bag Amendment Regulations.
120
The latter is undoubtedly an import licensing mechanism, since
the person wishing to import the type of permitted bags must
apply for a clearance. As such, Mauritius plastic bag regula-
tions are peculiar in that they surreptitiously combine a total
ban with a quota system through licensing procedures. The im-
port quota applies to those willing to obtain a license to import
exempted plastic bags.
Pursuant to Article 2.4 of the TBT Agreement, WTO mem-
bers are obligated to base technical regulations, standards, and
conformity assessment procedures on international standards,
wherever relevant ones exist.
121
In this vein, Mauritian
measures prescribe the applicable international standards to
biodegradable and compostable bags.
122
According to the TBT
Agreement, members are similarly required to notify other
members of the technical regulation through the WTO Secre-
tariat, either before the adoption of the measure
123
or immedi-
ately after, if the measure was adopted to address an urgent
117. See Environmental Protection (Banning of Plastic Bags) (Amendment)
Regulations, No. 233 (2015), GOVERNMENT GAZETTE OF MAURITIUS, p. 1555
[hereinafter Mauritius, Plastic Bag Amendment Regulations].
118. Id. § 4 (new).
119. Id. §3 (new).
120. Id. § 5(E).
121. See TBT Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.4.
122. See Mauritius, Plastic Bag Amendment Regulations, third sched. The
standards referred to are American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), the European Standard (ES), and the International Organisation for
Standardisation (ISO).
123. TBT Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.9.
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problem of national security, health, or environment.
124
The
same transparency requirement applies when the measure is a
quantitative restriction, like the bans of plastic bags. This is
what prompted Mauritius to notify the TBT Committee and the
Market Access Committee of its plastic bag regulation.
125
2. Seychelles
Seychelles is an archipelago situated in the Indian Ocean
with an economy that mainly relies on tourism and fishing.
Like Mauritius, the imperative to sustainably manage its re-
sources is crucial because the effects of climate change expose
its economy to serious risks. As a result, Seychelles passed a
number of environmental protection regulations in recent
years, including its first plastic bag restriction in 2008.
126
The
Environment Protection (Restrictions on Plastic Bags) Regula-
tions (“Regulations 2008”) merely “restricted” the manufacture,
sale, and distribution of both nationally produced and imported
plastic bags.
127
The measure, which addressed the thickness of
plastic bags by stating they should not be below thirty microns,
allowed a twenty percent variation in the measurement of the
minimum thickness.
128
Even though the legislation, while not a
ban, did not define the word “restriction,” it incontestably qual-
ified as a quantitative restriction since it limited imports and
eventual manufacture for exports.
129
Seychelles was not yet a
WTO Member at the time that it implemented Regulations
2008.
Seychelles is one of the youngest WTO members. It initiated
its accession process in 1995
130
and only completed it in 2014.
131
124. Id. art. 2.10.
125. Committee on Market Access, Notification of Mauritius Pursuant to the
Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions, at 5, WTO
Doc. G/MA/QR/N/MUS/2 (Feb. 3, 2017).
126. Environment Protection (Restrictions on Plastic Bags) Regulations
2008, SI. 39 (Sey.) [hereinafter Regulations 2008].
127. Id. § 3(1).
128. Id. § 3(2).
129. Appellate Body Report, China ² Measures Related to the Exportation of
Various Raw Materials, ¶ 320, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/AB/R (adopted Feb. 22,
2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials].
130. Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Seychelles, Acces-
sion of the Republic of Seychelles, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/SYC/1 (May 31, 1995).
131. See General Counsel, Accession of the Republic of Seychelles, WTO Doc.
WT/L/944 (Dec. 10, 2014).
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Seychelles became the 161st official WTO Member on March
26, 2015.
132
Recently acceding WTO members have taken on
additional commitments on a number of issues, especially trad-
ing rights and import and export restrictions. These additional
commitments are an integral part of the WTO Agreement and
are consequently enforceable in dispute settlement.
133
As part
of its specific accession obligations, Seychelles committed to not
“introduce, reintroduce or apply quantitative restrictions on
imports or other non-tariff measures such as licensing, quotas,
prohibitions, bans and other restrictions having equivalent ef-
fect that cannot be justified under the provisions of the WTO
Agreement.”
134
In other words, it can only do so if the measure
is justified under a WTO Agreement provision, which is what it
would fairly plead should the measure be questioned. Likewise,
Seychelles committed to the same terms regarding export re-
strictions, notably that after accession it “would apply its laws
and regulations governing export measures, including prohibi-
tions, export licensing requirements and other export control
requirements, in conformity with WTO provisions including
those contained in Articles XI, XVII, XX and XXI of the GATT
1994.”
135
Simply put, Seychelles committed not to impose ex-
port restrictions, except to protect the values under Article XX
or to achieve national security.
While Seychelles ensured that “all of its laws, regulations or
other measures governing technical barriers to trade, stand-
ards, and certification would be in full conformity with the pro-
visions of the TBT Agreement,” it would only do so progressive-
ly.
136
The transition period, within which Seychelles agreed to
comply with WTO rules by bringing its laws, regulations, and
practices in conformity after accession, ended in December
132. See Roberto Azevêdo, Notification of Acceptance and Entry Into Force,
WTO Doc. WT/LET/1036 (Apr. 1, 2015). Seychelles is also the thirty-third
economy to join the WTO pursuant to Article XII of the WTO Agreement.
133. See Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, supra note 129, ¶
266, where the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s recommendation that Chi-
na bring its export duty and export quota measures into conformity with its
WTO obligations (undertaken in its Accession Protocol).
134. See Working Party on the Accession of the Republic of Seychelles, Re-
port, ¶ 191, WTO Doc. WT/ACC/SYC/64 (Nov. 5, 2014) (emphasis added).
135. Id. ¶ 240.
136. Id. ¶ 282.
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2015.
137
Seychelles notified the TBT Committee of its new plas-
tic regulations in February 2017.
138
The new plastic bag law,
the Environment Protection (Restriction on manufacturing, im-
portation, distribution and sale of Plastic Bags) Regulations
2017 (“Regulation 2017”),
139
which came into force on July 1,
2017, repealed Regulations 2008.
Under the Plastic Bag Regulations 2017, the manufacture,
importation, and distribution of plastic bags are prohibited in
Seychelles, with the exception of certain types of plastics in-
cluded in a Schedule.
140
Seychelles’ measures are largely in-
spired by, when they are not simply a reproduction of, the
Mauritian 2015 Plastic Bag Amendment Regulations in several
respects. Not only do both regulations distinguish between
prohibited and permitted plastic bags, but the content of their
exemption list of permitted plastic bags displays a high degree
of similarity. Like Mauritius, Seychelles exempts from the ban
bags that are used for waste disposal, carried by persons dis-
embarking from aircrafts or ships, or manufactured for export,
among others.
141
However, unlike Mauritius, which requests
permits for exempted, biodegradable, and compostable plastic
bags, Seychelles’ licensing system only considers both exempt-
ed and biodegradable bags.
142
Import permit applications for
biodegradable bags in Seychelles must be accompanied by a
certificate of conformity to the applicable standards stipulated
137. For a study of the legal analysis of the accession procedures to the
WTO, including the obligation to undertake domestic reforms to adapt to
WTO rules, see DYLAN GERAETS, ACCESSION TO THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (2018).
138. Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of Seychelles,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/SYC/3 (Feb. 7, 2017). Notification was done under Article
2.9 of the TBT Agreement, i.e. prior to the entry into force of the measure.
139. Environment Protection (Restriction on Manufacturing, Importation,
Distribution and Sale of Plastic Bags) Regulations 2017, at 207, S.I. 37 of
Supplement to Official Gazette (June 30, 2017) (Sey.) [hereinafter Plastic Bag
Regulations 2017]. This law was adopted concomitantly with the Environ-
ment Protection (Restriction on Importation, Distribution and Sale of Plastic
Utensils and Polystyrene Boxes) Regulations 2017, S.I. 38 of Supplement to
Official Gazette (June 30, 2017) (Sey.) (dealing, as the name indicates, with
plastic utensils (such as spoons, forks, knives, plates, bowls, cups and trays)
and polystyrene boxes (i.e. takeaway boxes used for containing food)). For
purposes of this article, only the Plastic Bag Regulations 2017 are of interest.
140. Plastic Bag Regulations 2017, § 3.
141. Id., first sched..
142. Id. §§ 4(1)(a)²(b).
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in the Second Schedule of the regulations and validated by the
Seychelles Bureau of Standards.
143
Seychelles’ plastic bag im-
port licenses are governed by the Customs Management (Pro-
hibited and Restricted) Regulations 2014 that contains lists of
prohibited and restricted goods.
144
It is noteworthy that ex-
empted plastic bags, like those manufactured for export or for
waste disposal, are not subject to any particular standards. It
is therefore the responsibility of the manufacturer to meet the
standards of the country it contemplates exporting to.
3. South Africa
South Africa was among the first countries to implement
plastic bag legislation. In the early 2000s, the South African
authorities decided to address the waste problem relating to
the collection and disposal of plastic bags as a growing envi-
ronmental problem.
145
The South African Minister of Environ-
mental Affairs and Tourism then passed regulations prohibit-
ing the manufacture, sale, and commercial distribution of plas-
tic carrier bags and plastic flat bags for use within the country,
whether domestically manufactured or imported.
146
As a com-
promise between different stakeholders, some of whom were
opposed to an outright ban,
147
this regulation also specified the
thickness and printing requirements of approved plastic
bags.
148
These requirements are found in the Compulsory Spec-
143. Id. §§ 4(2)²(3).
144. Customs Management (Prohibited and Restricted Goods) Regulations
2014, at 1293, S.I. 43 of Supplement to Official Gazette (Sey.).
145. See generally Hasson et al., supra note 55.
146. See Plastic Carrier Bags and Plastic Flat Bags Regulations, GN R.625
of GG 24839 (May 9, 2003).
147. The first draft regulation published in May 2000 intended to ban, by
January 2001, the supply of carry bags of a thickness of less than thirty mi-
crons, as well as ban the supply of carry bags of a thickness less than eighty
microns by June 2001. See Proposed Regulations under Section 24 of Envi-
ronment Conservation Act, GN 1994 of GG 21203 (May 19, 2000).
148. See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of South
Africa, WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/ZAF/29 (May 14, 2003) (specifying the require-
ments for carrier bags and flat bags made from thermoplastic materials). The
underlying legislation is the Standards Act of 1993 Compulsory Specification
for Plastic Carrier Bags and Flat Bags, GN R.867 of GG 25082 (June 20,
2003).
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ification developed by the South African Bureau of Standards
(SABS) and published by the Minister of Trade and Industry.
149
South Africa’s plastic bag regulation uses a combination of
regulatory and market-based tools to curb consumers’ demands
for plastic bags.
150
In addition to the ban on thin plastic bags,
the measure also institutes a tax on the use of thicker bags.
151
The tax is collected by supermarkets at the point of purchase,
who in turn charge customers and consequently give the cus-
tomers the option to decline the bags.
152
Notably, the regulation
also contains a list of exempted bags, including “bread bags,
refuse bags, bin liners, household plastic bags, and primary
packaging, such as barrier bags.”
153
Likewise, plastic bags
manufactured for export are also exempted.
154
South Africa
cites environmental protection as the objective and rationale of
this measure and has notified the WTO Committee on Tech-
nical Barriers to Trade, as well as announced its objective to
the entire membership in accordance with Article 10.6 of the
TBT Agreement.
155
Interestingly, upon amending its plastic bag standards in
2012, South Africa included human health and safety as the
rationale for the new standards.
156
After the creation of the Na-
tional Regulator for Compulsory Specifications (NRCS) in
149. See Compulsory Specification for Plastic Carrier Bags and Flat Bags,
GN R.867 of GG 25082 (June 20, 2003) [hereinafter South Africa Gazette No.
25082]. Section 4.2 requires that plastic bags be thicker than twenty-four
microns. Id. § 4.2.
150. Studies suggest that high taxes on plastic bags tend to reduce their
usage in the tax-imposing country. For a case study of the ensuing drastic
drop in plastic consumption in Botswana, a country with a similar regulation
to South Africa, see Johane Dikgang & Martine Visser, Behavioural Response
to Plastic Bag Legislation in Botswana, 80 S. AFR. J. ECON. 123 (2012).
151. See Dikgang, Leiman & Visser, supra note 7, at 59²60.
152. See Clapp & Swanston, supra note 5, at 320. On the public’s response
to this “mixed tool,” see generally Hasson et al., supra note 55.
153. South Africa Gazette No. 25082, § 1.4. Section 3.1 defines carrier bags
as thin or flimsy bags, used to separate incompatible products at the final
point of sale, for health, hygiene, or transport purposes. Id. § 3.1.
154. Id. § 1.5.
155. See Notification of South Africa, supra note 148.
156. See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of South
Africa, WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/ZAF/155 (Oct. 9, 2012) (stating South Africa’s
objective and rationale as health and safety).
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2008
157
³then operating as a regulatory department of SABS³
the government proposed to amend the plastic bag standards in
2012.
158
The goal of the amendment was to improve the tracea-
bility of plastic carrier and flat bags, facilitating improved reg-
ulatory efficiency. The new compulsory specification for plastic
bags, published in 2013,
159
states that plastic carrier bags and
flat bags shall comply with SANS 695,
160
a South African na-
tional standard for plastic bags developed by SABS in compli-
ance with Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement.
161
The document al-
so describes the approval process for plastic bags, as well as the
conformity of production and plastic bags testing.
D. Other African Countries Join the Race
Apart from the foregoing surveyed measures, other African
countries have also joined the fight against plastic bags, span-
ning all regions in Africa. In Central Africa, Cameroon adopted
a law in 2012 that regulates the manufacture, importation, and
sale of lightweight plastic bags.
162
The law provides for
157. See National Regulator for Compulsory Specifications Act 2008, GN
728 of GG 31216 (July 4, 2008).
158. See Proposed Amendment of the Compulsory Specification for Plastic
Carrier Bags and Flat Bags-VC 8087, GN R.776 of GG 35707 (Sept. 28, 2012).
159. See Compulsory Specification for Plastic Carrier Bags and Flat Bags-
VC 8087, GN R.651 of GG 36808 (Sept. 6, 2013) [hereinafter South Africa
Gazette No. 36808]. See also Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Ad-
dendum: Notification of South Africa, WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/ZAF/155/Add.1
(Sept. 10, 2013).
160. See South Africa Gazette No. 36808, § 3.1. See South African Bureau of
Standards, SOUTH AFRICAN NATIONAL STANDARD: PLASTIC CARRIER BAGS AND
FLAT BAGS (1st ed., 2011) [hereinafter SANS 695].
161. TBT Agreement, supra note 25, at Annex 3, is a “Code of Good Prac-
tice” addressed to standardizing bodies like the SABS for the “preparation,
adoption and application of standards.” It requires, among others, that
standards must not be “prepared, adopted or applied with a view to, or with
the effect of, creating unnecessary obstacles to international trade.” See TBT
Agreement, supra note 25, at Annex 3(E). SANS 695 applies to both domesti-
cally manufactured and imported plastic bags alike.
162. See Arrêté Conjoint No. 004/MINEPDED/MINCOMMERCE du 24 oc-
tobre 2012 portant réglementation de la fabrication, de l’importation et de la
commercialisation des emballages non biodégradables. [Joint Order No.
004/MINEPDED/MINCOMMERCE of October 24, 2012 Regulating the Man-
ufacture, Import and Marketing of Non-Biodegradable Packaging] (Came-
roon),
https://www.cameroontradeportal.cm/tradeportal/templates/Tip_accueil/docs/
arretes/Arrete_minepded_mincommerce.pdf. This order was co-signed by both
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measures to limit the production of lightweight plastic bags
and promote the recycling, reuse, and other forms of recovery of
waste from such packaging. According to the law, these activi-
ties are subject to the obtention of an environmental permit to
ensure the traceability of their recycling and destruction in an
environmentally sound manner.
163
The Cameroonian measure followed the example set by the
Republic of Congo one year earlier, when the President of the
Republic issued a decree prohibiting the production, import,
marketing, and use of plastic bags for the sale of food, water,
and other beverages.
164
Also prohibited in Congo are the pro-
duction, importation, marketing, and use of so-called oxo-
biodegradable bags and plastic films.
165
The other Central Afri-
can country with a similar measure is the DRC, whose law
prohibits the manufacture, import, marketing, and use of plas-
tic bags, sachets, films, and other plastic packaging for the sale
of food, water, and any beverages.
166
The ban also extends to
non-biodegradable plastic bags.
167
Besides Central African
countries, Uganda
168
in East Africa and four other West Afri-
the Minister of Environment, Nature Protection and Sustainable Develop-
ment and the Minister of Trade. Id. It has not yet been notified to the WTO.
163. Id. art. 4.
164. See Décret No. 2011-485 du 20 juillet 2011 réglementant la production,
importation, la commercialisation et l’utilisation des sacs, sachets et films en
plastique [Decree No. 2011-485 of July 20, 2011 regulating the production,
import, marketing and use of plastic bags, sachets and films], Journal Officiel
de la République du Congo [J.O.] [Official Gazette of Congo], July 20, 2011,
art. 1. The measure was notified to the other WTO Members under Article
2.9 of the TBT Agreement. See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade,
Notification of Congo, WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/COG/1 (Sept. 12, 2013).
165. Décret No. 2011-485 du 20 juillet 2011, art. 2.
166. See Décret No. 17/018 du 30 décembre 2017 portant interdiction de
production, d’importation, de commercialisation et d’utilisation des sacs, sa-
chets, films et autres emballages en plastique [Decree No. 17/018 of Decem-
ber 30, 2017 prohibiting the production, import, marketing, and use of plastic
bags, sachets, films and other packaging], Journal Officiel de la République
Démocratique du Congo [J.O.] [Official Gazette of Democratic Republic of
Congo] (Dec. 30, 2017), art. 1.
167. Id.
168. See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of Uganda,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/UGA/17 (Apr. 25, 2008) (notification under Article 2.9 of
the TBT Agreement). This is a standard for the manufacture of plastic bags.
It should be noted that a subsequent measure was adopted in 2009, which is
not captured by this TBT notification, and which prohibits the importation,
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can countries³namely Benin,
169
Cote d’Ivoire,
170
Senegal,
171
and Togo
172
³all currently have a plastic regulation in force.
II. PLASTIC BAG REGULATIONS AS RESTRICTIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
The WTO agreements codify a number of circumstances in
which members can lawfully address their health and envi-
ronment-related policy objectives. What follows is an analysis
local manufacture, sale or use of plastic bags. The Finance Act, No. 14 (2009)
UGANDAGAZETTE SUPPLEMENT No. 8 § 3.
169. See Loi No. 2017-39 du 26 décembre 2017 portant interdiction de la
production, de l’importation, de l’exportation, de la commercialisation, de la
détention, de la distribution et de l’utilisation des sachets en plastique non
biodégradables en République du Bénin [Loi No. 2017-39 of December 26,
2017 prohibiting the production, import, export, marketing, possession, dis-
tribution, and use of non-biodegradable plastic bags in the Republic of Benin],
FAOLEX No. LEX-FAOC179912, Dec. 26, 2017) (Benin).
170. See Décret No. 2013-327 du 22 Mai 2013 portant interdiction de la
production, de l’importation, de la commercialisation, de la détention et de
l’utilisation des sachets plastiques [Decree No. 2013-327 of May 22, 2013 pro-
hibiting the production, import, marketing, possession, and use of plastic
bags], FAOLEX No. LEX-FAOC140523 (May 22, 2013) (Côte d’Ivoire).
171. See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of Senegal,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/SEN/9 (May 4, 2016) (notification under Article 2.9 TBT
Agreement). The measure is Loi No. 2015-09 du 04 mai 2015 relative à
l’interdiction de la production, de l’importation, de la détention, de la distri-
bution, de l’utilisation de sachets plastiques de faible micronnage et à la ges-
tion rationnelle des déchets plastiques [Law No. 2015-09 of 04 May 2015 pro-
hibiting the production, importation, possession, distribution, use of small-
size plastic bags and the rational management of plastic waste], Journal Off-
ciel de la Republique du Senegal [J.O.] [Official Gazette of the Republic of
Senegal] (Jul. 4, 2015).
172. See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Notification of Togo,
WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/TGO/2 (Mar. 6, 2012) (notification under Article 2.9 TBT
Agreement). The measure at issue is Décret No. 2011-003/PR du 05 janvier
2011 fixant les modalités de gestion des sachets et emballages plastiques au
Togo [Decree No. 2011-003/PR of January 5, 2011 assigning management
procedures for plastic bags and packaging in Togo], FAOLEX No. LEX-
FAOC143632, Jan. 5, 2011. The implementing text is Arrêté
No.11/13/MIZFIT/CAB du 22 mars 2013 fixant les modalités de gestion des
sachets, sacs et emballages plastiques biodégradables et des additifs pour la
production des sachets et emballages plastiques biodégradables au Togo [Or-
der No. 11/13/MIZFIT/CAB of March 22, 2013 assigning management proce-
dures for biodegradable plastic bags, sachets, and packaging and additives for
the production of biodegradable plastic bags and packaging in Togo] Journal
Officiel de la République Togolaise [J.O.R.T] [Official Journal of Togo] (June
7, 2013).
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of how African countries’ measures banning the importation,
manufacture, use, or sale of plastic bags in their respective ter-
ritories fit within the WTO regime landscape.
It is worth recalling that developing African countries have
seldom, if ever, been on the receiving end of WTO disputes
from developed-country members, nor among themselves.
173
This reality is complemented by Article 24.1 of the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding, which asks WTO members to exercise
due restraint in bringing disputes against Least-Developed
Countries (LDCs). This explains why some developing-country
members, like Cameroon, and LDCs like the DRC or Rwanda,
may feel safe to operate at the margin of legality by not notify-
ing the relevant WTO bodies of their respective plastic bag
measures. This pattern runs counter to the WTO’s transparen-
cy requirement.
A. Per Se Illegality of Plastic Bag Restrictions
The common denominator of the laws banning the importa-
tion of plastic bags is that they qualify in one way or another as
quantitative restrictions and, as such, are measures prohibited
by Article XI of the GATT.
174
As a form of protection, tariffs are
preferred over quantitative restrictions, principally because
they are far more transparent.
175
As one of the cornerstones of
the GATT system,
176
Article XI:1 of the GATT provides, in rele-
vant part, that “[n]o prohibitions or restrictions other than du-
ties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through
quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be
instituted or maintained by any [Member] on the importation
of any product of the territory of any other [Member].”
177
173. It is important to note that the WTO recorded its first intra-African
dispute in July 2018. See Request for Consultations by Tunisia, Morocco –
Provisional Anti-Dumping Measures on School Exercise Books from Tunisia,
WTO Doc. WT/DS555/1 (July 10, 2018).
174. Article XI of the GATT provides for the general elimination of quanti-
tative restrictions. GATT, supra note 20, art. XI.
175. See Panel Report, Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products (Turkey – Textiles), ¶ 9.63, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/R (adopted
Nov. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Panel Report, Tukey – Textiles]. There are also
some economic, policy and practical reasons for this preference. See JOHN
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICRELATIONS 139²42, 153²54 (2d ed. 1997).
176. Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 175, ¶ 9.63.
177. GATT, supra note 20, art. XI:1.
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This provision applies to “all measures” instituted or main-
tained by a WTO member “other than measures that take the
form of duties, taxes or other charges,” which prohibit or re-
strict imports and exports.
178
Regardless of whether the meas-
ure is legally binding or not, it will be covered by the provision
if it restricts imports or exports.
179
However, not every condi-
tion or burden associated with import formalities or require-
ments are inconsistent with Article XI:1. Rather, “only those
that are limiting, that is, those that limit the importation or
exportation of products” are concerned, and this limiting effect
may be demonstrated “through the design, architecture, and
revealing structure of the measure at issue considered in its
relevant context.”
180
The permissive aspects of plastic regula-
tions, namely the type of plastic inscribed in the exemption
lists in Mauritius and Seychelles, are measures caught by Arti-
cle XI:1. Through their design, architecture, and revealing
structure, these regulations limit the importation of exempted
plastic bags via the system of clearance, which is only granted
at the discretion of the authority in charge and is non-
automatic.
Apart from quotas and import and export licenses, Article
XI:1 also applies to “other measures” that restrict trade, which
may take virtually any form, especially import bans.
181
It fol-
lows that the other aspects of the plastic bag bans, which are
not import or export licenses³notably the prohibitive part of
these regulations³fall under this category of “other measures.”
Here, all of the surveyed measures qualify as “other measures”
within the meaning of Article XI:1.
178. Report of the Panel, Japan – Trade in Semi-Conductors, ¶ 104, L/6309
(May 4, 1988), GATT BISD (35
th
Supp.), at 116, 143 (1989).
179. Id. ¶ 106. See Appellate Body Report, China – Raw Materials, supra
note 129, ¶ 320 (deciding that Article XI covers those prohibitions and re-
strictions that have a limiting effect on the quantity or amount of a product
being imported or exported).
180. Appellate Body Report, Argentina ² Measures Affecting the Importation
of Goods, ¶ 5.217, WTO Doc. WT/DS438/AB/R (adopted Jan. 26, 2015).
181. See Report of the Panel, US – Tuna I, supra note 22, ¶¶ 5.17²5.18
(finding that the provisions of the MMPA under which import prohibition on
certain yellowfin tuna and certain yellowfin tuna products from Mexico were
imposed amounted to restrictions and, thus, were inconsistent with Article
XI:1).
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B. Plastic Bag Bans Must Be Non-Discriminatory
Quantitative restrictions are further subject to a non-
discrimination requirement akin to the most-favored nation
clause in Article I of the GATT. Article XIII:1 of the GATT pro-
vides that quantitative restrictions applied under Article XI to
the products of one country should be extended to like products
of other WTO members.
182
It does so by requiring that the im-
portation of all third countries be “similarly prohibited or re-
stricted” because “like products should be treated equally, irre-
spective of their origin.”
183
As such, a plastic bag-restricting
country is henceforth under the obligation to treat all imported
plastic bags similarly. The story may not end there, however, if
a regional trade agreement (RTA) like the Rwanda-proposed
EAC plastic ban law applies.
The question that follows is whether Article XXIV, which
regulates the formation and functioning of goods RTAs, can
waive the obligation of non-discrimination as affirmed by the
Appellate Body in EC – Bananas III,
184
even in the presence of
a quantitative restriction. In Turkey – Textiles, the Panel ruled
that WTO members cannot deviate from the non-
discrimination obligation of Article XIII, even when an RTA is
involved.
185
That finding, however, rested on the fact that
quantitative restrictions were not necessary for the formation
of the customs union. What the adjudicator did not rule on is of
particular interest to this article, particularly because the EAC
is not a customs union in formation, but is essentially operat-
ing as such. In effect, the Turkey–Textiles Appellate Body made
“no finding on the issue of whether quantitative restrictions
found to be inconsistent with Article XI and Article XIII of the
GATT 1994 will ever be justified by Article XXIV,”
186
indicating
the likelihood of a finding in a different direction.
182. GATT, supra note 20, art. XIII:1.
183. Appellate Body Report, European Communities ² Regime for the Im-
portation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas (EC – Bananas III), ¶ 190, WTO
Doc. WT/DS27/AB/R (adopted Sept. 25, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, EC – Bananas III].
184. Id. at ¶ 191.
185. See Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 175, ¶¶ 9.188²9.189.
186. Appellate Body Report, Turkey ² Restrictions on Imports of Textile and
Clothing Products (Turkey – Textiles), ¶ 65, WTO Doc. WT/DS34/AB/R
(adopted Nov. 19, 1999) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, Turkey – Textiles].
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It can be argued that the EAC, as an RTA among developing
countries and notified under the Enabling Clause,
187
is not con-
cerned with the Turkey – Textiles ruling delivered in the con-
text of Article XXIV. This is true only to a certain extent. Pur-
suant to Paragraph 3 of the Enabling Clause, any favorable
treatment shall be designed solely for promoting trade among
the parties and “not to raise barriers to or create undue diffi-
culties for the trade of any other contracting parties.”
188
The
Enabling Clause has been interpreted as lex specialis vis-à-vis
Article XXIV.
189
Lex specialis is a general international law
principle pursuant to which a law unique to a particular re-
gime, or applicable in specific scenarios, prevails over the gen-
eral law.
190
Following the application of that principle, one may
contend that the Enabling Clause only prevails over Article
XXIV in tariff barriers. With regard to non-tariff measures like
quantitative restrictions, the Enabling Clause provides for
their elimination subject to “criteria and conditions” yet to be
set by the WTO Ministerial Council.
191
Consequently, in the absence of these criteria and conditions,
the issue of whether the Enabling Clause embraces the elimi-
187. See Committee on Trade and Development, Notification of the East
African Community, WTO Doc. WT/COMTD/N/14 (Oct. 11, 2000); see also
GATT Council, Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reci-
procity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, ¶ 2(c), L/4903 (Nov.
28, 1979), GATT BISD (26
th
Supp.), at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Enabling
Clause] (allowing developing countries to enter into regional trade agree-
ments among themselves without necessarily meeting the strict requirements
of Article XXIV).
188. Enabling Clause, supra note 187, ¶ 3.
189. See Committee on Trade and Development, Legal Note on Regional
Trade Arrangements Under the Enabling Clause by the Secretariat, ¶5, WTO
Doc. WT/COMTD/W/114 (May 12, 2003).
190. See generally Regis Y. Simo, The Law of International Responsibility:
The Case of the WTO as a ‘Lex Specialis’ or the Fallacy of a ‘Self-contained’
Regime, 22 AFRICAN J. INT’L&COMP. L. 184 (2014). For the function and scope
of the lex specialis rule as a in international law, see Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep.
on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) [here-
inafter Report of the Study Group]. The Report notes that lex specialis is a
“widely accepted maxim of legal interpretation and technique for the resolu-
tion of normative conflicts.” See id. at ¶ 56. The appointment of this study
group was a response to the growing concerns about the fragmentation of
international legal norms characterized mainly by the growing proliferation
of international tribunals and courts.
191. See Enabling Clause, supra note 187, ¶ 2(c).
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nation of non-tariffs measures remains an open question.
192
That is why, following the lex specialis principle, coupled with
the Appellate Body ruling in EC – Bananas III, finding that “a
waiver from the obligations under Article I [does not] impl[y] a
waiver from the obligations under Article XIII,”
193
the non-
discrimination requirement of quantitative restrictions apply
mutatis mutandis to RTAs under both the GATT and the Ena-
bling Clause. Therefore, although the 2016 EAC Bill has not
yet been adopted by all East African countries, the Turkey –
Textiles dictum would guide its relation with WTO rules.
194
By
leaving the door open, the Appellate Body in Turkey – Textiles
suggested that EAC countries may not necessarily violate WTO
non-discrimination rules in Article XIII in the future if they do
not similarly restrict plastic bags from non-EAC countries.
C. Transparency of Plastic Bag Regulations
Transparency is one of the cornerstones of the multilateral
trading system. It is a requirement in each WTO-covered
agreement
195
and is generally divided into three main obliga-
tions: (1) to publish all relevant laws, regulations, and
measures of general application; (2) to notify the WTO of these
laws and regulations; and (3) to administer these measures, for
example, through the establishment of a point of contact.
Transparency serves the information gap-filling function while
enabling members to comply with their commitments. The
Trade Policy Review Mechanism instituted in the GATT during
192. Legal Note on Regional Trade Arrangements Under the Enabling
Clause by the Secretariat, supra note 189, ¶ 53(b).
193. Appellate Body Report, EC – Bananas III, supra note 183, ¶ 183.
194. See Appellate Body Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 186, ¶ 65.
195. See GATT, supra note 20, art. X; General Agreement on Trade in Ser-
vices, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994); Agree-
ment on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 63, Apr.
15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994); TBT Agreement, supra
note 25, arts. 2, 10; Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosani-
tary Measures art. 7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 UNTS 493, 33 I.L.M. 1165 (1994);
Agreement on Agriculture art. 18, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Es-
tablishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.
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the Uruguay Round serves this purpose, as its function is to
review members’ trade policies at regular intervals.
196
Article X of the GATT requires “prompt” publication of all
trade measures in a domestically accessible gazette, “in such a
manner as to enable governments and traders to become ac-
quainted with them.”
197
WTO members monitor compliance
with transparency by requiring notification of measures to the
relevant bodies. The Decision on Notification Procedures for
Quantitative Restrictions, adopted by the Council for Trade in
Goods in 2012,
198
specifies the format and the timelines for the
notification of quantitative restrictions. According to this Deci-
sion, WTO members must make “complete notifications of all
quantitative restrictions in force” from September 30, 2012,
and in two yearly intervals thereafter.
199
Any intervening
changes shall be reported “as soon as possible,” which must not
be beyond “six months from their entry into force.”
200
This De-
cision contemplates the situation of a reverse or counter-
notification, whereby a member notifies the committee of the
imposition of quantitative restrictions by another member that
has not given prior notification.
201
It follows that, except for
Cote d’Ivoire,
202
Mauritius,
203
and Seychelles,
204
which have no-
196. On the origins, objectives, and the functioning of the Trade Policy Re-
view Mechanism, see Petros Mavroidis. Surveillance Schemes: The GATT’s
New Trade Policy Review Mechanism, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 374 (1992).
197. A measure that has been published eight months after it was imple-
mented has not been considered “prompt.” See Panel Report, European Com-
munities and its Member States – Tariff Treatment of Certain Information
Technology Products, ¶ 7.1076, WTO Doc. WT/DS375/DS376/DS377/R (adopt-
ed Sept. 21, 2010).
198. See Council for Trade in Goods, Decision on Notification Procedures for
Quantitative Restrictions, WTO Doc. G/L/59/Rev.1 (July 3, 2012).
199. Id. ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
200. Id.
201. Id. ¶ 5.
202. Committee on Market Access, Notification of Côte D’Ivoire Pursuant to
the Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions, WTO
Doc. G/MA/QR/N/CIV/1 (Oct. 2, 2014) (notification for biennial period 2014-
2016, and representing restrictions in force as of Jan. 8, 2014).
203. Committee on Market Access, Notification of Mauritius Pursuant to the
Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions, WTO Doc.
G/MA/QR/N/MUS/3 (Mar. 15, 2017) (notification for biennial period 2016-
2018, representing restrictions in force as of Feb. 28, 2017).
204. Committee on Market Access, Notification of Seychelles Pursuant to the
Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions, WTO Doc.
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tified their plastic regulations to the Market Access Committee,
other states that have not complied with their obligations are
not immune from a reverse notification. It also is worth noting
that transparency for quantitative restrictions under the GATT
is without prejudice to notification requirements under the SPS
and the TBT Agreement.
205
D. Relationship between Quantitative Restrictions and National
Treatment of Plastic Bags
Article XI:1 of the GATT not only regulates measures insti-
tuted on imports, but also reaches restrictions placed “on the
exportation or sale for export” of any product destined for the
territory of any other contracting party.
206
This has nourished a
debate concerning the relationship between Article XI:1 and
Article III of the GATT. Distinguishing between measures fall-
ing under either of these provisions has not always been
clear.
207
It suffices to say that, while Article XI applies to
measures that affect the importation of goods, Article III ap-
plies to measures affecting imported products.
208
In India – Autos, the United States and the European Com-
munities challenged India’s import restrictions in the automo-
tive sector as violating both Articles III and XI of the GATT.
209
The Panel addressed the relationship between the two provi-
sions, finding that it is possible for different aspects of a meas-
ure to affect the competitive opportunities of imports in differ-
ent ways, making them fall within the scope of either Article
III or Article XI.
210
Consequently, there may be an overlap be-
tween the two provisions.
211
Restrictions on plastic bags, there-
fore, can fall simultaneously under both provisions. Despite
G/MA/QR/N/SYC/1 (Jan. 19, 2018) (covering notification for biennial period
2016-2017, and representing restrictions in force as of Jan. 1, 2016).
205. Decision on Notification Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions, su-
pra note 188, n.1. For TBT, see infra Part V.D.
206. See GATT, supra note 20, art. XI:1.
207. On this controversial relationship, see Erich Vranes, The WTO and
Regulatory Freedom: WTO Disciplines on Market Access, Non-Discrimination
and Domestic Regulation Relating to Trade in Goods and Services, 12 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 953, 957²62 (2009).
208. Panel Report, India – Measures Affecting the Automotive Sector (India
– Autos), ¶7.220, WTO Doc. WT/DS146/DS175/R (adopted Dec. 21, 2001).
209. See id.
210. Id. ¶ 7.224.
211. Id.
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this uneasy relationship, the WTO adjudicator nevertheless
cautioned against the risk of rendering Article III superfluous
“[i]f Article XI:1 were interpreted broadly to cover also internal
requirements.”
212
III. CHARACTERIZING PLASTIC BAG BANS AS “DOMESTIC
REGULATION” UNDER WTO LAW
As stated, when the impugned laws do not restrict the impor-
tation of plastic bags, the laws would most likely affect plastic
bags once they have cleared customs or when they are domesti-
cally produced. This can take the form of internal taxation, like
sales taxes, or other internal regulations, such as safety re-
quirements. As mentioned earlier, however, classifying a
measure as either a market access restriction or a domestic
regulation is not always a straightforward task. The legal con-
sequences attached thereto are crucial. Indeed, while a quanti-
tative restriction is prima facie prohibited, a domestic regula-
tion under Article III can only be illegal with regard to the
manner in which international tax and regulatory measures
are applied, particularly if they favor domestic products over
imported products.
213
South Africa imposes a levy on both domestically produced
and imported thick plastic bags, while banning thinner ones.
Since the reach of WTO-covered agreements extends beyond
the elimination of border measures, the national treatment
(NT) principle prohibits the use of domestic fiscal and regulato-
ry environmental measures, like South Africa’s, for protection-
ist ends.
214
In the words of the Appellate Body in Japan – Alco-
holic Beverages II, NT “obliges Members of the WTO to provide
equality of competitive conditions for imported products in re-
lation to domestic products.”
215
Regardless of whether a specific
tariff commitment was made, NT not only covers explicitly dis-
212. Id. ¶ 7.220 (citing Report of the Panel, Canada – Administration of the
Foreign Investment Review Act, ¶5.14, L/5504 (Feb. 7, 1984), GATT BISD 30
th
Supp.), at 140 (1985)).
213. See Report of the Panel, United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930 (US – Section 337), ¶ 5.10, L/6439, GATT BISD (36th Supp.) 345
(adopted Nov. 7, 1989).
214. See GATT, supra note 20, art. III.
215. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan –
Alcoholic Beverages II), at 16, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1,
1996) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II].
2019] Sustainable Development in Africa 283
criminatory internal measures, but also policies that indirectly
have such consequences.
216
This sometimes supports the argu-
ment that WTO agreements curb countries’ freedom because
the potential reach of the NT principle relates to virtually all
governmental policies of every WTO member.
217
The NT provision thus prevents South Africa from discrimi-
nating against imported plastic bags in favor of domestically
manufactured ones. Such conduct will likely fall afoul of Article
III of GATT. The crux of the matter, however, when it comes to
the determination of whether there has been discrimination
between domestic and imported goods, rests on the blurry no-
tion of “likeness” of the products under consideration. While
discrimination between unlike goods would generally be per-
mitted, the determination that two products are “like” has
evolved as one of the thorniest issues in the WTO jurispru-
dence, and one of the most discussed issues in the WTO litera-
ture. Likeness does not necessarily imply equivalence or identi-
calness, but certainly includes a degree of similarity. That is
why it has been stressed countless times that the determina-
tion as to whether two goods are like should be made on a
“case-by-case basis,”
218
taking into consideration a number of
factors, including “the product’s end-uses in a given market;
consumers’ tastes and habits, which change from country to
country; the product’s properties, nature and quality.”
219
Under this provision, whether two plastic bags are like does
not necessarily involve their process or production method
(PPM). This is because Article III of the GATT only touches on
the characteristics of the merchandise as such, and not the way
216. Id. The relevant part reads: “The Article III national treatment obliga-
tion . . . extends also to products not bound under Article II.” Id.
217. For a further elaboration on the legal and economic interpretation of
the NT, see generally, Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Still Hazy After
All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO
Case Law on Tax Discrimination, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 39 (2004).
218. See Robert Hudec, GATT/WTO Constraints on National Regulation:
Requiem for an ‘Aim and Effects’ Test, 32 INT’L LAWYER 619 (1998). Robert
Hudec believes that proceeding this way has deprived the WTO dispute set-
tlement mechanism of a coherent conception of “likeness” when comparing
domestic to imported goods. Id. at XX. He then suggests reliance on the “aim
and effects” approach of the measures, which is more intuitively sound to
cure that multiplicity of likenesses. Id. at XX.
219. Appellate Body Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 215,
at 21.
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it is manufactured or obtained.
220
Accordingly, South Africa
cannot treat two bags having the same physical characteristics
in a different way simply because they were not produced or
harvested in the same manner, as their PPMs do not prevent
them from being like. Since likeness is understood as a relative
concept,
221
domestic environmental measures become an issue
only when they discriminate between imported and domestic
like products.
222
When that happens, the country in question
can seek to justify discrimination under the general exception
clause.
IV. REGULATION OF PLASTIC BAGS JUSTIFIABLE AS
MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Countries imposing a ban on the importation of plastic bags
contrary to Article XI of the GATT generally invoke Article XX
of the GATT as a justification. This also holds true for the
South African plastic bag levy, if found to violate Article III of
the GATT.
A. A Brief Overview of the General Exceptions
Article XX of the GATT allows governments to enact trade
measures to protect human, animal, or plant life or health,
provided the measures do not discriminate and are not used as
protectionism in disguise. WTO members are therefore allowed
to justify violations of their GATT obligations through recourse
to one of the exceptions listed in Article XX. In fact, the GATT’s
drafters intended this series of grounds to trump trade-
liberalizing obligations present in the GATT legal instruments.
This goes to show that, at times, other social concerns take
precedence over trade commitments.
220. Report of the Panel, US – Tuna I, supra note 22, ¶¶ 5.14²5.15 (empha-
sis in the original).
221. In a famous and oft-quoted Appellate Body decision, it stated that
“[t]he accordion of ¶likeness’ stretches and squeezes in different places as dif-
ferent provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied.” See Appellate Body
Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, supra note 215, at 21.
222. See Hudec, supra note 218, at 626. Hudec, on his part, does not seem to
“understand why important issues of regulatory policy should turn on these
sterile concepts of physical likeness.” Id. On the intricacies of the definition
and application of non-discrimination, see generally, Julia Y. Qin, Defining
Nondiscrimination under the Law of the World Trade Organization, 23 B.U.
INT’L L. J. 215 (2005).
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Article XX of the GATT contains so-called “affirmative de-
fenses.” Affirmative defenses typically allow members to pur-
sue legitimate policy objectives, which, while not among the
WTO Agreement’s own specific objectives, are deemed compati-
ble with them.
223
When a dispute arises, the onus to prove that
the measures comply with one of the acceptable grounds rests
on the party invoking it, who then, if successful, would be law-
fully discharged of the obligation he sought to deviate from.
This balances the value of the trade commitment on the one
hand, and the endorsement of members’ regulatory diversity on
the other hand.
224
Apart from trade measures, Article XX of the
GATT can also be invoked to justify violations of internal
measures,
225
as well as to provide exceptions to obligations as-
sumed under the Protocol of Accession.
226
The Appellate Body has devised a two-pronged test of the
GATT-consistency of a measure sought to be justified under
Article XX: “[T]he measure at issue must not only come under
one or another of the particular exceptions - paragraphs (a) to
(j) - listed under Article XX; it must also satisfy the require-
ments imposed by the opening clauses of Article XX.”
227
Unless
compliance with an Article XX subparagraph has been shown,
a panel may not proceed with the examination of the compli-
223. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting Imports
of Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, 15-16, WTO Doc.
WT/DS33/AB/R, (adopted May 23, 1997) (stating that Article XX is a “¶limited’
exception from obligations under certain other provisions of the GATT 1994,
not positive rules establishing obligations in themselves. They are in the na-
ture of affirmative defences.”).
224. See Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, supra note 6, ¶ 121, where,
overturning the Panel ruling, the Appellate Body made it clear that WTO
members are free to unilaterally regulate their market subject to their com-
pliance with the relevant GATT disciplines.
225. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affect-
ing Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶ 115, WTO Doc.
WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001) (finding that a measure that is incon-
sistent with the NT provision of Article III of the GATT was capable of justi-
fication under Article XX) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbes-
tos].
226. See Panel Report, China – Measures Related to the Exportation of Vari-
ous Raw Materials, ¶¶ 7.158²7.160, WTO Doc. WT/DS394/R (adopted Feb.
22, 2012) [hereinafter Panel Report, China – Raw Materials].
227. Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline, supra note 47, at 22.
286 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 45:1
ance of the measure with the chapeau
228
³since compliance by
the invoking-member paired with the requirements of the cha-
peau is the ultimate stage for deciding whether an exception
applies in the case.
229
B. Are Plastic Bag Bans “Necessary to Protect Human, Animal
or Plant Life or Health?”
While trade should not normally be depicted as hostile to
human, animal, or plant health, Article XX(b) of the GATT is a
perfect illustration of the existing tensions between interna-
tional trade and public health and environmental concerns.
230
Under Article XX(b), a qualifying measure imposed to protect
human, animal, or plant life has to be “necessary.”
231
In Thai-
land – Cigarettes, the Panel explained that a measure would be
considered necessary “only if there were no alternative meas-
ure consistent with the General Agreement, or less inconsistent
with it, which Thailand could reasonably be expected to employ
to achieve its health policy objectives.”
232
This necessity test
requires governments to use the least GATT-inconsistent
measure that is reasonably available to achieve the Article
XX(b) objective.
The main objective of plastic bag measures is to protect hu-
man health and the environment from the nuisances resulting
from the use of plastic bags.
233
A growing body of literature il-
lustrates how plastics bags are harmful to the environment, as
well as to human health. Apart from the migration of chemicals
228. Panel Report, China – Raw Materials, supra note 226, ¶ 7.469. See also
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, ¶ 139, WTO Doc. WT/DS332/AB/R (adopted Dec. 17, 2007) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Retreaded Tyres].
229. Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, supra note 6, ¶ 157.
230. Appellate Body Report, Brazil –Retreaded Tyres, supra note 228, ¶ 210.
231. See GATT, supra note 20, art. XX(b).
232. Report of the Panel, Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and In-
ternal Taxes on Cigarettes (Thailand – Cigarettes), ¶ 75, DS10/R (Nov. 7,
1990), GATT BISD (37th Supp.), at 200 (1991).
233. Regarding human health, a press statement from the Kenyan govern-
ment expressly states that the purpose of the ban “is to avoid health and en-
vironmental effects resulting from the use of plastic bags,” and includes, inter
alia, “[e]ndangering human health when used for packaging food in particu-
lar hot food.” See Geoffrey Wahungu, Press Statement on Total Ban on All
Plastic Bags, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENT MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY,
http://www.nema.go.ke/images/Docs/Awarness%20Materials/PRESS__STATE
MENT_ON_TOTAL_BAN_ON_ALL_PLASTIC_BAGS.pdf.
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from plastics to food items,
234
plastic bag litter, when filled with
rainwater, is known to be a breeding ground for insects. These
insects, like mosquitoes, facilitate the spread of diseases, espe-
cially in malaria-endemic countries in sub-Saharan Africa.
235
Seen from this angle, the plastic bag bans are capable of
achieving the objectives for which they are designed. In other
words, the regulation of plastic bags can be justified under Ar-
ticle XX(b) as a measure “necessary” for the protection of “hu-
man, animal or plant life or health.”
236
Even when the regula-
tions do not necessarily lead to a dispute, members have sys-
tematically relied on Article XX, particularly Article XX(b), to
justify their quantitative restrictions.
237
C. Plastic Bag Regulations as Measures “Relating to the Con-
servation of Exhaustible Natural Resources”
Article XX(g) of the GATT addresses a departure from the
GATT rules for environmental protection purposes. A three-tier
test is required for a measure to be justified under this excep-
tion: the measure must (1) “relate to” (2) the “conservation of
exhaustible natural resources” and (3) be made effective in con-
junction with “restrictions on domestic production or consump-
tion.”
238
The vagueness of the term “exhaustible natural re-
sources” often gives rise to diverging and conflicting interpreta-
tions regarding the scope of the provision.
GATT and WTO adjudicators have adopted a rather expan-
sive definition of this term to include any living and non-living
resources. In the words of the Appellate Body in US – Shrimp,
the “generic term ¶natural resources’ in Article XX(g) is not
¶static’ in its content or reference but is rather ¶by definition,
234. See generally Whitt et al., supra note 9, at 166; see also Rolf U. Halden,
Plastics and Health Risks, 31 ANNUAL REV. PUB. HEALTH 179 (2010).
235. See UNEP, supra note 10, at 23.
236. See GATT, supra note 20, art. XX(b).
237. See Committee on Market Access, Note by Secretariat: Quantitative
Restrictions: Factual Information on Notification Received, Committee on
Market Access, ¶ 3.12, WTO Doc. G/MA/W/114/Rev.1 (Apr. 27, 2017) (stating
that, of the 886 quantitative restrictions notified as of Apr. 21, 2017, 630
quantitative restrictions [approximately sixty-nine percent of all quantitative
restrictions] cited Article XX. Article XX(b) alone was invoked in forty percent
of all cases). This figure excludes instances where Members have simply cited
“protection of animal life and of the environment,” without specifically men-
tioning Article XX(b). See id. ¶ 3.13.
238. GATT, supra note 20, art. XX(g).
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evolutionary.’”
239
The Appellate Body added that “[i]t is, there-
fore, pertinent to note that modern international conventions
and declarations make frequent references to natural resources
as embracing both living and non-living resources.”
240
This
finding adopted a dynamic approach to the interpretation of
the term “exhaustible natural resources.” Thus, salmon, dol-
phins, clean air, and virtually any resource qualify.
241
A re-
source need not be rare or endangered to qualify as “exhausti-
ble.” Furthermore, the measure must not only “relate to,” such
as being “primarily aimed at”
242
the conservation of natural re-
sources, but it must also operate “in conjunction” with re-
strictions on domestic production or consumption.
243
The latter
requires a certain degree of “even-handedness in the imposition
of restriction,” although not necessarily “identical treatment of
domestic and imported products.”
244
Plastic bag bans may be justified under Article XX(g) of the
GATT as measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources.”
245
Since the term “exhaustible natural re-
sources” was not given a meaning in the drafting history of the
clause, the panels and the Appellate Body have been left to in-
terpret the phrase within the customary international law
rules codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
WTO adjudicators have not always been consistent in their rul-
ings regarding the meaning of “exhaustible natural resources,”
sparking criticism not only from the disputants, but also in le-
gal literature. As the GATT and WTO jurisprudence on this
provision displays, Article XX(g) can be invoked for virtually
anything relating to natural resources. Despite Article XX(g)’s
historical purpose to address exhaustible minerals, issues such
as air pollution, fish, and raw materials, among others, have
been upheld as falling under Article XX(g).
246
By extension, a
239. Appellate Body Report, US – Shrimp, supra note 6, ¶ 130.
240. Id.
241. On the GATT and WTO disputes grappling with the matter, see gener-
ally Manjiao Chi, ¶Exhaustible Natural Resource’ in WTO Law: GATT Article
XX(g) Disputes and their Implications, 48 J.WORLD TRADE 939 (2014).
242. Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline supra note 47, at 18.
243. See GATT, supra note 20, art. XX(g).
244. Appellate Body Report, US – Gasoline supra note 47, at 21.
245. See GATT, supra note 20, art. XX(g).
246. See generally Chi, supra note 241, for a survey of the different disputes
where Article XX(g) was invoked and for the interpretation of the term “ex-
haustible natural resources” by the respective panels and the Appellate Body.
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ban on the importation and sale of plastic bags can be justified
under this provision because plastic bags are known to be ob-
noxious to the soil, the subsoil, and marine life.
V. PLASTIC BAG REGULATIONS AS “TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO
TRADE”
As studied above, the surveyed plastic bag regulations qualify
either as market access or as “behind the border” measures ca-
pable of justification under Article XX of the GATT. It is not
rare, however, for countries’ actions to fall under two or more
WTO-covered agreements at the same time. This is the case for
the TBT Agreement, which, in its function, sometimes coincides
with the GATT.
247
What follows is therefore an analysis of the
TBT Agreement to plastic measures.
A. The TBT Agreement as a “Special” Law Applicable to Plastic
Bag Regulations
Although the provisions of the TBT Agreement and the GATT
can overlap and apply simultaneously in their scope and con-
tent, WTO members’ obligations are not the same.
248
While
overlap of the GATT and the TBT Agreement is almost inevita-
ble, it may also lead to a conflict of norms where two or more
obligations under separate agreements claim precedence over a
particular matter. The General interpretative note to Annex 1A
of the WTO Agreement attempts a solution by providing the
following: “[i]n the event of conflict between a provision of the
[GATT] and a provision of another agreement in Annex 1A to
the [WTO Agreement], the provision of the other agreement
shall prevail to the extent of the conflict.”
249
Strictly speaking,
247. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, ¶ 100, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/AB/R
(adopted Apr. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Ciga-
rettes] (noting that “technical regulations are in principle subject not only to
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, but also to the national treatment obliga-
tion of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, as ¶laws, regulations and requirements
affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distri-
bution or use’ of products.”).
248. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Concerning the
Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, ¶ 405, WTO
Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted June 13, 2012) [hereinafter Appellate Body
Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico)].
249. See WTO Agreement, supra note 6, general interpretative n. to Annex
1A.
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this would mean that the TBT Agreement would prevail over
the GATT to the extent of the conflict. The story, however, does
not end there. The TBT Agreement prevails pursuant to this
note only to the extent of the conflict, but it does not preclude
the GATT’s relevance.
When there is no conflict between two or more agreements,
the WTO adjudicator resorts to the lex specialis derogat lege
generali principle.
250
In the WTO context, contrary to disengag-
ing the general norm in favor of the specific rule, lex specialis
has been used to channel the sequence of analysis between
general and specific rules.
251
In effect, as the United Nations
International Law Commission Study Group suggests in its re-
port on the fragmentation of international law, it is not always
necessary to set aside the general rule when applying lex spe-
cialis as a conflict rule in a case.
252
This means that, while the
general rule remains applicable to the case, the WTO adjudica-
tor first analyses the challenged measure against the require-
ment of the specific agreement, such as the TBT Agreement,
before addressing its compatibility with the lex generalis, in
250. For a critique of the maxim’s vagueness and its application in the
fragmented international law system, see Anja Lindroos, Addressing Norm
Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex Specialis, 74
NORDIC J. INT’L L. 27 (2005). The author argues that, while the lex specialis
may be suited to resolve conflicts within sub-regimes (e.g., the WTO regime),
the maxim may find it hard to operate in a non-hierarchical international
legal system made of different legal orders where some are even considered
as “self-contained.” Id. at 30. This is because, in certain circumstances, two
norms may well be regarded as special, say, for our purposes, environmental
law and trade law. See id. at 41²42. For instance, the Appellate Body consid-
ered that whatever the status of the “precautionary principle” in the field of
international environmental law, it had not yet become binding for the pur-
pose of interpreting members’ obligations under WTO covered agreements.
Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones), ¶¶123²125, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (adopted Feb. 13, 1998). For a critical analysis of the WTO
dispute settlement system as lex specialis in the international law rules on
state responsibility, see Simo, supra note 190.
251. See, for instance, Panel Report, Turkey – Textiles, supra note 175,
¶9.92, where the Panel stated that, since the WTO Agreement is a “Single
Undertaking,” WTO obligations flowing from the respective covered agree-
ments are therefore cumulative. Consequently, WTO members “must comply
with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ¶conflict’ between them.”
Hence, in the Panel’s view, the special rule prevails over the general rule only
when they cannot be applied simultaneously. Id.
252. See Report of the Study Group, supra note 190, ¶ 31.
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this case the GATT.
253
This is what the Panel in EC – Sardines
did when it relied on EC – Bananas III, where the Appellate
Body had suggested that, “where two agreements apply simul-
taneously, a panel should normally consider the more specific
agreement before the more general agreement.”
254
That Panel
consequently preceded its analysis of the claim under Article
III of the GATT by its examination under the TBT Agreement.
Yet, “[a]s a general principle, panels are free to structure the
order of their analysis as they see fit,” which may include tak-
ing account of the manner in which a claim is presented by a
complainant.
255
This means that strict adherence to the lex spe-
cialis principle may not always hold. In practice, therefore, a
panel may choose to begin its analysis with the general rule
(the GATT) before falling back to the more specific rule (the
TBT Agreement), or even exercise judicial economy if analysis
under the specific agreement is not necessary in resolving the
dispute. This entails that, although plastic bags may well be
TBT measures, a panel can choose to begin its examination un-
der the GATT and not even come back to the TBT Agreement.
Alternatively, a panel may opt to follow the lex specialis se-
quence by opting to first analyze the claim under the TBT
Agreement.
B. The Scope of Application of the TBT Agreement to Plastic
Bag Regulations
The TBT Agreement imposes multilateral legal disciplines on
technical regulations and standards, which are two legal in-
struments available to WTO members. Established WTO case
law makes it clear that qualifying a measure as a technical
regulation or a standard is a threshold issue that falls under
the ambit of the TBT Agreement. For instance, in EC – Sar-
dines, the Appellate Body stated that “whether a measure is a
technical regulation is a threshold issue because the outcome of
253. See Joost Pauwelyn, Cross-Agreement Complaints before the Appellate
Body: A Case Study of the EC-Asbestos Dispute, 1 WORLD TRADE REV. 63, 82²
83 (2002).
254. Panel Report, European Communities – Trade Description of Sardines
(EC – Sardines), ¶ 7.15, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002)
[hereinafter Panel Report, EC – Sardines].
255. Appellate Body Report, Canada – Measures Relating to Exports of
Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain, ¶ 126, WTO Doc. WT/DS276/AB/R
(adopted Sept. 27, 2004).
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this issue determines whether the TBT Agreement is applica-
ble.”
256
In other words, “[i]f the measure . . . is not a technical
regulation, then it does not fall within the scope of the TBT
Agreement.”
257
Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement defines a “technical regula-
tion” as a “document which lays down product characteristics
or their related processes and production methods, including
the applicable administrative provisions, with which compli-
ance is mandatory,” and may also exclusively include or deal
with “terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling
requirements as they apply to a product, process or production
method.”
258
Plastic bag bans qualify as technical regulations in
the sense of Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement because the regu-
lations “lay down” the characteristics of the plastic bags that
are either prohibited or exempted. A “characteristic” has been
defined by standing WTO case law as “¶features,’ ¶qualities,’ ¶at-
tributes,’ or other ¶distinguishing mark[s]’ of a product . . . [re-
lating] inter alia, to a product’s composition, size, shape, colour,
texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity,
density, or viscosity.”
259
This adds to the definition provided by
Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, which gives examples of
product characteristics as including “terminology, symbols,
packaging, marking or labelling requirements.”
260
While this is
not necessary to meet the definition of “technical regulation” in
Annex 1.1 of the TBT Agreement, which may be confined to
simply laying down “only one or a few” characteristics,
261
some
of these regulations delve deeper into the details by defining
the end-uses of the banned products. For instance, Mauritius
speaks of bags “designed for carrying”
262
or those “meant to
256. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Trade Description of
Sardines, ¶ 175, WTO Doc. WT/DS231/AB/R (adopted Oct. 23, 2002).
257. Id.
258. TBT Agreement, supra note 25, at Annex 1.1.
259. Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, supra note 225, ¶ 67.
260. See TBT Agreement, supra note 25, at Annex 1.1.
261. Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Prohibiting
the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products (EC – Seal Products), ¶ 5.11,
WTO Doc. WT/DS400/DS401/AB/R (adopted June 18, 2014) [hereinafter Ap-
pellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products].
262. SeeMauritius, Plastic Bag Regulations, § 2.
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carry goods.”
263
Rwanda, on the other hand, provides the chem-
ical formula (CH
2
=CH
2
).
264
Another important feature of the technical regulation is that
it is mandatory to comply with the measure specifying product
characteristics. A technical regulation was interpreted by the
Appellate Body in EC – Seal Products as a document establish-
ing or prescribing something, and consequently has “a certain
normative content.”
265
In other words, the regulation must
“regulate the ¶characteristics’ of products in a binding or com-
pulsory fashion.”
266
For example, a Rwandan law that defines
the interdicted “polythene bag” as “a synthetic industrial prod-
uct with a low density composed of numerous chemical mole-
cules ethene with a chemical formula; (CH
2
=CH
2
)”
267
is defi-
nitely a technical regulation that specifies product characteris-
tics in the sense of Annex 1.1, the compliance of which is also
compulsory.
Some of these laws further rely on international standards
when adopting their measures, especially when the technical
regulations provide that, for an exempted bag to be imported, it
must conform to a particular standard. The case of the Mauri-
tian compostable plastic bag regulation is a prime example,
since the importer is provided with a list of international
standards to choose from.
268
The substantive scope of the TBT Agreement also covers con-
formity assessment procedures. Conformity assessment proce-
dures are defined in Annex 1.3 of the TBT Agreement as “any
procedure used, directly or indirectly, to determine that rele-
vant requirements in technical regulations or standards are
fulfilled.”
269
The South African plastic bag regulation is the
most elaborate with its conformity assessment procedures, par-
ticularly since it addresses production control and routine test-
ing procedures for plastic bags.
270
263. SeeMauritius, Plastic Bag Amendment Regulations, § 4.
264. See Rwanda, Plastic Bag Law, art. 2.
265. Appellate Body Report, EC – Seal Products, supra note 261, ¶ 5.10.
266. Appellate Body Report, EC – Asbestos, supra note 225, ¶ 68.
267. See Rwanda, Plastic Bag Law, art. 2.
268. SeeMauritius, Plastic Bag Amendment Regulations, third sched.
269. TBT Agreement, supra note 25, at Annex 1.3.
270. Compulsory Specification for Plastic Carrier Bags and Flat Bags-VC
8087, supra note 149, at Annexure B.
294 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 45:1
C. The TBT Legal Disciplines on Plastic Bag Regulations
The TBT Agreement recognizes countries’ rights to adopt the
standards they consider appropriate; for example, to protect
human, animal, or plant life or health, to safeguard the envi-
ronment, or to meet other consumer interests. Furthermore,
members are not prevented from taking measures necessary to
ensure that their country’s standards are met. The concern of
the TBT Agreement is to ensure that legitimate technical regu-
lations, standards, testing, and certification procedures do not
create unnecessary obstacles to trade.
271
The main legal disci-
plines of the TBT Agreement that are relevant for this article
are found under Article 2. Article 2.1 stipulates that imported
products be accorded treatment no less favorable than like
products of national origin. Article 2.2 emphasizes that tech-
nical regulations be no more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfill a legitimate objective, such as protection of the environ-
ment.
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement uses similar language as
Article III:4 of the GATT in requiring “treatment no less fa-
vourable than that accorded to like products of national origin
and to like products originating in any other country.”
272
This
provision prohibits the use of technical regulation to discrimi-
nate against imported like products in favor of domestic
ones.
273
Unlike Article III:4 of the GATT, where the detri-
mental impact on the competitive conditions can suffice to
prove a violation, the fact that a measure distinguishes be-
tween like products is insufficient to establish inconsistency
under Article 2:1 of the TBT Agreement. To investigate if a
measure actually accords “treatment no less favourable,” the
adjudicator has to also analyze whether the “detrimental im-
pact” stems exclusively from “a legitimate regulatory distinc-
tion” rather than “reflecting discrimination against the group
of imported products.”
274
This includes whether the design, ar-
chitecture, or the revealing structure of the measure is impar-
tial in its application. Pursuant to Article 5.1.1 and Annex 3.D
271. See TBT Agreement, supra note 25, at sixth recital of the pmbl.
272. Id. art. 2.1.
273. See Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, supra note 247, ¶¶
156²60 (where the Appellate Body upheld the Panel’s finding that clove ciga-
rettes imported from Indonesia and menthol cigarettes produced in the Unit-
ed States were like products within the meaning of Article 2.1).
274. Id. ¶ 182.
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of the TBT Agreement, the non-discrimination discipline also
applies to conformity assessment procedures set up by South
Africa.
Although countries are free to pursue a “legitimate objective,”
or objectives, and define their own level of protection, the
choice of the means at their disposal is controlled by Article 2.2
of the TBT Agreement. The Panel in EC – Sardines explained:
[T]he TBT Agreement, like the GATT 1994, . . . accords a de-
gree of deference with respect to the domestic policy objectives
which Members wish to pursue. At the same time, however,
the TBT Agreement, like the GATT 1994, shows less deference
to the means which Members choose to employ to achieve
their domestic policy goals.
275
In US – Tuna II (Mexico), the Appellate Body elaborated on the
“less trade-restrictive” test and stated:
[A]n assessment of whether a technical regulation is ¶more
trade-restrictive than necessary’ within the meaning of Arti-
cle 2.2 of the TBT Agreement involves an evaluation of a
number of factors . . . : (i) the degree of the contribution made
by the measure to the legitimate objective at issue; (ii) the
trade restrictiveness of the measure; and (iii) the nature of
the risk at issue and the gravity of the consequences that
would arise from non-fulfilment of the objective(s) pursued by
the Member through the measure.
276
This assessment implies a comparison of the challenged meas-
ure and the possible less trade-restrictive alternatives, taking
into account whether any alternative is “reasonably availa-
ble.”
277
If a complainant is able to identify a less trade-
restrictive alternative that would achieve a level of protection
equal to that achieved by the challenged measures, the existing
measures would be considered more trade-restrictive than nec-
essary under Article 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Article 2.2 of
the TBT Agreement also enjoins any panel in assessing the “le-
gitimate objective(s)” of a measure to consider “the risks that
non-fulfilment would create.”
278
This means weighing “both the
likelihood and the gravity of potential risks (and any associated
275. Panel Report, EC – Sardines, supra note 254, ¶ 7.120 (emphasis add-
ed).
276. Appellate Body Report, US – Tuna II (Mexico), supra note 248, ¶ 322.
277. Id.
278. TBT Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.2.
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adverse consequences) that might arise in the event that the
legitimate objective being pursued would not be fulfilled.”
279
Accordingly, “an alternative means of achieving the objective
that would entail greater ¶risks of non-fulfilment’ would not be
a valid alternative, even if it were less trade-restrictive.”
280
The
latter renders the alternative to the rationale of plastic bags
difficult to defend.
The TBT Agreement addresses “product characteristics or
their related processes and production methods” reflected in
technical regulations
281
and requires that these regulations
conform to basic principles of transparency and non-
discrimination.
282
Pursuant to Article 2.4 of the TBT Agree-
ment, members shall use relevant international technical
standards, such as the ISO, as the basis for their own technical
regulations, except where such international standards would
be an ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of
the legitimate policy objectives.
283
For instance, any biode-
gradable plastic bags imported in Mauritius and Seychelles
shall comply with the stipulated existing international stand-
ards.
284
D. Transparency Requirement of Plastic Bag Regulations in the
TBT Agreement
Article 2.9 of the TBT Agreement requires WTO members to
notify, through the WTO Secretariat, all other WTO members
of their proposed technical regulation.
285
This is an ex ante
transparency obligation since the measure has to be notified
prior to its entry into force, and in an early enough stage of the
process to leave room for comments and suggestions for
amendments. Members are also expected to “promptly” publish
or otherwise make available any forthcoming technical regula-
279. Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation,
Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R, ¶
7.467 (June 13, 2012).
280. Id. (emphasis added).
281. See TBT Agreement, supra note 25, at Annex 1.1.
282. See generally id. arts. 2.9, 2.10.
283. Id. art. 2.4.
284. See (1) Mauritius, Plastic Bag Amendment Regulations, § 5E, third
sched.; and (2) Seychelles, Plastic Bag Regulations 2017, § 4(2), second sched.
285. TBT Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.9.
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tions.
286
What constitutes promptness in this case is not ex-
pressly defined. In addition, there must be a “reasonable” peri-
od of time between notification and the entry into force of the
proposed technical regulation.
287
This period, normally no less
than six months, is meant to allow time for exporters to adapt
their production accordingly.
288
The TBT Agreement provides
for instances where exceptional circumstances may justify de-
parture from Articles 2.9 and 2.12. These are situations “where
urgent problems of safety, health, environmental protection or
national security arise or threaten to arise.”
289
In such a sce-
nario, the member concerned is subject to an ex post notifica-
tion and consultation obligation, a situation that can easily be
subject to abuse.
The provisions of Articles 2.10 (more lenient) and 2.9 (more
stringent) of the TBT Agreement do not easily cohabit and have
been the object of several concerns.
290
Kenya and Mauritius
have made their notifications under Article 2.10, while Congo,
Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Togo and Uganda have noti-
fied their technical regulation under Article 2.9.
291
On the other
spectrum lie countries that have not complied with either Arti-
cle 2.9 or Article 2.10, and are hence operating illegally from
286. Id. art. 2.11.
287. Id. art. 2.12.
288. See Appellate Body Report, US – Clove Cigarettes, supra note 247, ¶
275. The Appellate Body also noted, however, that a Member may depart
from this obligation if this interval “would be ineffective to fulfil the legiti-
mate objectives pursued.” Id.
289. TBT Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.10.
290. See, e.g., Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, Note by the Secre-
tariat: Specific Trade Concerns Raised in the TBT Committee, WTO Doc.
G/TBT/GEN/74/Rev.9 (Oct. 17, 2011) (where Mexico, the United States and
the European Union raised concerns about Kenya’s Alcohol Control Act 2010
which would, in their opinion, give rise to unnecessary barriers to trade).
Kenya had notified the measure under Article 2.10, even though it should
have been notified under Article 2.9. See Committee on Technical Barriers to
Trade, Notification of Kenya, WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/KEN/282 (Mar. 1, 2011).
Kenya eventually changed its notification requirements and complied with
the provision of Article 2.9. See Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade,
Revision: Notification of Kenya, WTO Doc. G/TBT/N/KEN/282/Rev.1 (Dec. 12,
2012).
291. See supra, Parts I.B²D.
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the TBT Agreement standpoint. These countries are Benin,
Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire,
292
the DRC and Rwanda.
293
E. Specific Trade Concerns
One institutional provision of the TBT Agreement is the crea-
tion of the TBT Committee. Composed of representatives of all
WTO members, it meets when necessary, but at least once a
year.
294
The mandate of the TBT Committee is to afford
“[m]embers the opportunity of consulting on any matters relat-
ing to the operation” of the TBT Agreement.
295
Central to its
function is the administration of specific trade concerns (STCs)
raised by members. STCs are not formal disputes; rather, they
are mere forums for discussion on members’ proposed measures
notified to the TBT Committee, or on their implementation.
While it is not formally an antechamber for disputes, as mem-
bers do not need to go through the TBT Committee to lodge a
complaint against a trade-restricting measure, STCs send
strong messages regarding the (in)consistency of targeted
members’ TBT measures and offer room for correction. Conse-
quently, STCs are considered an “informal form of resolution of
trade conflicts” that run in parallel to the dispute settlement
mechanism.
296
The WTO records more than five hundred STCs
accessible to the public through a comprehensive database.
297
CONCLUSION
This paper addresses plastic bag regulations adopted by Afri-
can countries in a bid to protect the environment and their citi-
zens’ health. The aggregate of these measures is the contribu-
tion of WTO African-country members to the objective of sus-
tainable development stipulated in the WTO constitution. Alt-
292. Although it has not yet done so under the TBT Agreement, Cote
d’Ivoire has already notified its measure under the GATT as a quantitative
restriction. See Notification of Côte D’Ivoire Pursuant to the Decision on Noti-
fication Procedures for Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 202.
293. See supra, Parts I.B²D.
294. TBT Agreement, supra note 25, art. 13.1.
295. Id.
296. Henrik Horn, Petros C. Mavroidis & Erik N. Wijkström, In the Shadow
of the DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT
Committees, 47 J. WORLD TRADE 729, 730 (2013).
297. See Technical Barriers to Trade Information Management System,
WORLD TRADEORG., http://tbtims.wto.org/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).
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hough the measures under review fall within the reach of Arti-
cle XI:1 of the GATT, which prohibits the use of quantitative
restrictions as a means of protection, as well as Article III of
the GATT, which precludes discrimination at the detriment of
imported products, they can also be justified under Article
XX(b) and (g) of the GATT. This article has further demon-
strated two trends in the application of the bans: one of total
ban, and the second combining the ban with a licensing scheme
for a category of exempted plastic bags. South Africa further
combines its regime of prohibition at the border with an inter-
nal mechanism of taxation.
The measures also fall under the TBT Agreement, which ad-
dresses the products’ regulation. While some of these countries
have notified their plastic bag ban under Article 2.9 of the TBT
Agreement, others have done it under Article 2.10. As dis-
cussed, notification under Article 2.10 is subject to an ex post
transparency obligation and, if not more prone to abuse than
notification under Article 2.9, it at least buys additional time
for any country in breach of its obligations under the TBT
Agreement. Other countries, in contrast, have chosen not to
notify their measures at all, thereby operating at the margin of
WTO legality, perhaps strengthened in that position by their
status as LDCs or developing-country WTO members.
